Methodological Individualism

212 Popperian methodological individualismthat the psychological factors Watkins invokes in order to explain socialphenomena are ‘dispositions’ in the sense of Gilbert Ryle (Watkins, 1952a:35–40). It may be recalled that Gilbert Ryle introduced his notion of ‘disposition’as a way of avoiding mentalistic language and as part of a behaviouristanalysis of ‘mental’ phenomena (Ryle [1949] 1963: 301–11). Presumably,Watkins’s use of the term ‘disposition’ – and despite his frequent use of the term‘attitude’ – is motivated by a similar wish to break with the subjectivism ofAustrian methodological individualism.Watkin’s first statement of the principle of methodological individualism gaverise to questions concerning its exact status. He replies that he had first thoughtthat it was analytic, and for three reasons: (1) because it is entailed by the truismthat ‘social things’ are created by ‘personal attitudes’, (2) because the social scientistand the historian have ‘direct access’ only to concrete individuals and (3)because it appeared ‘invulnerable’. Watkins now gives up his belief in the analyticityof the principle of methodological individualism and changes its status‘from a rule to an aspiration’ (Watkins, 1952b: 186). In a revised and expandedversion of his ‘Ideal Types and Historical Explanation’ (1953), can be found arestatement of methodological individualism, together with a statement of itsopposite; methodological holism.This principle [methodological individualism] states that social processesand events should be explained by being deduced from (a) principlesgoverning the behaviour of participating individuals and (b) descriptions oftheir situations. The contrary principle of methodological holism states thatthe behaviour of individuals should be explained by being deduced from (a)macroscopic laws which are sui generis and which apply to the social systemas a whole, and (b) descriptions of the positions (or functions) of the individualswithin the whole.(Watkins, 1953: 729)Watkins has now settled for a strictly methodological version of methodologicalindividualism. The epistemological thesis that social phenomena can, inprinciple, be explained in terms of individuals, is replaced by the methodologicalprinciple that they ‘should’ be thus explained. This means that Watkins has alsoreverted to his original belief concerning its status: Methodological individualismis a rule, not just an aspiration. Watkins gives two reasons for accepting methodologicalindividualism and rejecting methodological holism.1 Whereas physical things can exist unperceived, social ‘things’ like laws,prices, prime ministers and ration-books, are created by personal attitudes.(Remove the attitudes of food-officials, shop-keepers, housewives,etc., towards ration-books and they shrivel into bits of cardboard.) But