Methodological Individualism

Rational choice individualism 315which they also make a contribution … which, needless to say, in the presentstate of the arts appear to be light-years away – would include (i) the explanationof individual action in terms of individual desires and beliefs, (ii) theexplanation of macro-states in terms of individual actions, and (iii) theexplanation of desires and beliefs in terms of macro-states.(Elster, 1983a: 86; see also 1983c: 141ff)As we saw above, Elster recognises two types of causality in human affairs:supra-intentional and sub-intentional causality. The explanation of desires andbeliefs in terms of macro-states, mentioned in the quotation above, is a case ofsub-intentional causality. The different forms of this type of causality can besubsumed under the general heading of ‘socialisation’. As such, it is fullycompatible with the theory of society as subjectively meaningful action (seechapter 5) and does not imply any element of holism. But according to Elster,preferences are also shaped by class position and class interest (1982: 468ff;1983c: 141ff; 1985: 460). This introduces a structural element, which is holistic.Paradoxically, then, sub-intentional causality seems to be more holistic thansupra-intentional causality. The latter type of causality is a matter of the interactionbetween individuals, but there is nothing to indicate that this interaction isdetermined by structure.It is a peculiar feature of Elster’s ‘general sociological theory’ that it does notmake room for structural constraints upon action (see Taylor, 1986: 3–5). 34 It ispossible, however, to read the following quotation as implicit recognition of suchconstraints:Simply to postulate causal relationships between macro-variables will notdo. We may observe an empirical regularity … but we have explainednothing until we can show (i) how the macro-states at time t influence thebehaviour of individuals motivated by certain goals, and (ii) how these individualactions add up to new macrostates at time t1.(Elster, 1983a: 84; see also 1983b: 116)Elster’s general sociological theory seems to have much in common with therational choice models suggested by Coleman and Boudon, except that it ismuch less structuralistic than that of Coleman and less structuralistic even thanthat of Boudon. This is rather surprising, considering the fact that Elsterconceives of himself as a Marxist of sorts.Elster’s attempt to reinterpret Marx as a methodological individualist hasbeen rejected by a majority of Marxists (and some others), who feel that this isgoing too far. The number of critical writings is by now enormous, and quite alot deal with methodological individualism. 35 It is quite understandable if Elsterhas grown tired of defending himself against all this critique. Whether for this,or for some other reason, Elster seems to have decided that methodological individualismis not a subject he wants to discuss any more. His recent contributions