Methodological Individualism

336 Why methodological individualism?sociological psychology reflects the opposition between individualism and holism(see also Tajfel, 1972: 86ff and Doise, 1978: 28ff). The demarcation betweenindividualism and holism, then, cuts right through the discipline of socialpsychology. This fact is reflected in most textbooks on social psychology, whichtend to be a mix of psychology and sociology, rather than a clearly demarcatedarea of its own (Moscovici, 1972: 43–8).The distinction between a psychological and a sociological social psychologyshould not be confused with that between small group psychology and masspsychology. Number is not a variable that separates sociology from psychology.There is a sociological small group psychology, as well as a truly psychologicalmass psychology (cf. Sztompka, 1979: 100). The main bulk of contemporarysocial psychology is devoted to the study of small groups, but early socialpsychology was more interested in the psychology of nations, masses, crowds,publics and other collectives (see, e.g., Ginsberg, 1928 and Blumer, 1937: 144–6).MicrofoundationsIn the recent development of methodological individualism, it has often beendiscussed as a case of microfoundation. The reason for this is probably‘economic imperialism’. In economics, the clearest manifestation of methodologicalindividualism has for a long time been the request that macroeconomicsshould be provided with microfoundations. When social scientists from otherdisciplines adopt the economic approach, they also adopt the view of methodologicalindividualism as the demand that macro-theories must be provided withmicrofoundations in the form of rational choice (see chapter 10). But is the questfor microfoundations the same as reduction? It depends.In the case of economics, it is typically assumed that the proper microfoundationsof macroeconomics are Walrasian. This assumption makes the quest formicrofoundations in economics a case of strong reductionism. But it is not necessaryto conceive of all macrofoundations in this way. The failure, so far, toprovide macroeconomics with Walrasian microfoundations, may even make usdoubt the very possibility of strong reduction in the social sciences, as in allsciences. An alternative would be to conceive of microfoundations as partial andmore like a case of weak reduction. I think a strong case could be made for theview that a microfoundation is not the same as a reduction, in the original sense ofelimination. The very word ‘foundation’ has a meaning different from the words‘reduction’ and ‘elimination’. If we conceive of microfoundations in this ‘nonreductive’way, they become fully compatible with institutional and structuralindividualism. 26Normative individualismI suggested above, that methodological individualism is based on certain epistemologicaland ontological assumptions. If we include these assumptions in thedoctrine of methodological individualism, it is better conceived of as an individ-