Methodological Individualism

352 Methodological individualism restateduncertain, therefore, if reference to the physical situation is part also of thatversion, which states something about the definition of social concepts.The components of the social situation are even more of a problem. It mostobviously consists of other individuals. But it has also been suggested that, inaddition to individuals, it consists of institutions. 9 I have already argued that theinclusion of institutions in the situation is incompatible with the original, strongversion of methodological individualism. Since institutions are social wholes,even according to the methodological individualists themselves, to admit of themin the situation is to smuggle in holism through the backdoor. The social situation,according to strong methodological individualism, then, consists of otherindividuals. But these individuals are not mere figures in a landscape.Popper, in particular, has included the terms ‘interaction’ and ‘relations’ in hisformulations of methodological individualism. While the incorporation of ‘interaction’presents no problem, that of ‘relations’ does. Popper seems to use theterms ‘interaction’ and ‘relations’ interchangeably. This indicates that heconsiders social relations reducible to the interaction between individuals. Atleast, this is a plausible interpretation of methodological individualism. I believethat strong methodological individualism implies that social relations arereducible to the interaction between individuals (and their psychic states). Whatseems clear, however, is that strong methodological individualism can only assimilatecertain views about the nature of social relations, but must oppose thoseviews which are inextricably mixed up with a holistic view of society. Toconclude, the terms in which social phenomena are to be explained, are: individuals,their physical and psychic states, actions, interaction, social situation andphysical environment.Two additional points must be made before restating methodological individualism.First, methodological individualism is usually stated in the imperative, asindicated by the use of terms such as ‘should’ and ‘must’. But it has also beenstated in the indicative, as witnessed by the use of the term ‘can’, sometimes withthe addition ‘in principle’. It is only when stated in the imperative that methodologicalindividualism can be regarded as a strictly methodological principle orrule. When stated in the indicative, as a general thesis, and with the importantaddition ‘in principle’, methodological individualism becomes an epistemologicalthesis rather than a methodological rule (see Scott, 1960; Rosenberg, 1988:114f). Methodological individualism, then, has been stated at three differentlevels: (1) the methodological, (2) the epistemological and (3) the ontological (cf.Bunge, 1973: 167). Strictly speaking, there is a methodological versionsupported, but not entailed, by an epistemological and ontological thesis, respectively(Dray, 1972: 55–7). I have used the term ‘methodological individualism’ torefer to all versions of this doctrine, but sometimes, for the sake of clarity, (1) hasbeen referred to as ‘methodological individualism’, (2) as ‘epistemological individualism’10 or ‘individualist reductionism’, (3) as ‘metaphysical’ or ‘ontologicalindividualism’, and all three, but no one in particular, simply as ‘ individualism’in social science and history. I have also referred to all all three versions of