Methodological Individualism

Positivism in philosophy and social science 175In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap chooses a phenomenalist or‘autopsychological’ basis for his system. Later, under the influence of Neurath,he comes to adopt a physicalist position. According to physicalism, all scientificsentences are translatable into the universal physicalist language, i.e. to sentencesabout physical occurrences in space and time. Applied to the social sciences,physicalism says that all its sentences (insofar as they are about people or groupsof people, including organisations and institutions) can be translated intosentences about the movements of physical bodies in space and time (Carnap,1931: 434, 451f; [1932/33] 1959: 165ff).Among the logical positivists, Otto Neurath has written most extensivelyabout the social sciences, especially sociology. There is nothing to suggest,however, that Neurath should have been a champion of an epistemologicalreduction programme implying methodological individualism (Hempel, 1969a:165–74). Like the methodological individualists, Neurath repudiated, as metaphysical,concepts such as ‘folk spirit’, ‘spirit of a nation’, ‘spirit of the age’ andthe like (1944: 4). But not because they are holistic. His main charge againstthese concepts is that they are idealistic, something which they share with individualistconcepts such as ‘mental’, ‘personality’, ‘soul’, ‘motives’, etc. (Neurath[1931a] 1973: 325, 332, 356f; [1931/32] 1959: 289, 299). Neurath, then, is notan enemy of collectivism and holism. Amongst social scientific theories, hissympathies are clearly with Marxism, and he also suggests that his own ‘aggregationalprogram’ has a metaphysical counterpart in the holism of J.C. Smuts(Neurath, 1944: 20). 7 Neurath’s arch-enemy is idealism in every conceivableform, including the method of Verstehen (1930/31: 121; 1931a: 356–8; [1931/32]1959: 295). The alternative to idealism is physicalism, which is the modern formof materialism and in social science roughly takes the form of behaviourism.According to physicalism, unified science, including of course the social sciences,deals exclusively with physical occurrences in space and time. 8Now, it might be thought that physicalism implies methodological individualism.At times, Neurath also expresses himself in a way indicating that hesubscribes to ontological individualism. ‘Peoples, states, age groups, religiouscommunication, all are complexes built up of single individuals’ (Neurath[1931a] 1973: 386). But this does not imply any commitment to methodologicalindividualism. Neurath’s Marxist leanings make him critical towards the individualismof economic theory and to prefer, instead, an institutionalist theory, usingholist and collectivist notions such as ‘classes’, ‘states’, ‘feudalism’, ‘slavery’,‘tribes’, etc. ([1931a] 1973: 366, 389–403; [1931/32] 1959: 306–15). ‘The sociologistis completely unimpeded in his search for laws. The only stipulation isthat he must always speak, in his predictions, of structures which are given inspace and time’ ([1931/32] 1959: 301). Of some relevance is Neurath’sfrequently expressed opinion that it is often easier to predict the behaviour ofgroups and collectives than to predict the behaviour of single individuals. 9Nor does Neurath advocate any radical empiricist reduction programme. Hisone and only requirement for statements to be scientific is that they be stated inthe universal ‘slang’, or ‘jargon’, of physicalism. He makes the demand that all