Methodological Individualism

218 Popperian methodological individualismontological thesis that social phenomena are caused by individuals and nothingelse. Since Watkins is an adherent of the covering-law model of scientific explanation,methodological individualism can also be stated as a principle aboutlaws. Social phenomena can, and should, be explained by being deduced fromindividualist laws and initial conditions. There are no irreducible social lawsgoverning the behaviour of collectives. Methodological individualism has, finally,been stated as a principle concerning the meaning of concepts, but Watkins findsthis version less interesting.Watkins is a bit uncertain about the status of methodological individualism.He first believed that it is an analytical principle, valid a priori, then changed itsstatus from a rule to an aspiration and back again to a rule, justified mainly byphilosophical (epistemological and ontological) arguments. As distinguished fromPopper’s categorical version of methodological individualism, which admits ofno exception, Watkins’s version allows for half-way explanations in terms ofmacro phenomena.Institutional individualismMethodological individualism has also been defended by some other Popperiansand, especially, by Joseph Agassi and Ian C. Jarvie. They have both done a greatdeal to clarify and develop certain ideas in Popper’s philosophy of the socialsciences. They have made explicit what was only implicit and they have developedwhat was embryonic. Above all, they have tried to bring together Popper’smethodological individualism with his institutionalism. But in attempting this,Agassi and Jarvie reached for the impossible. As stated by Popper, methodologicalindividualism and methodological institutionalism are irreconcilabledoctrines. In their hands, therefore, methodological individualism eventuallyturned into something else, which Agassi called ‘institutionalistic individualism’.Joseph AgassiIn his highly suggestive article ‘Methodological Individualism’ (1960), JosephAgassi declares that his aim is ‘to defend institutionalistic individualism’, whichhe considers ‘to be Popper’s great contribution to the philosophy of the socialsciences’ (p. 244). Institutionalistic individualism is a via media between psychologismand holism, which combines the reasonable elements in both doctrines,while rejecting what is untenable (p. 248). Another important part of Popper’ssocial science methodology is situational logic (p. 264), or, what today goes by thename of ‘rational choice’. According to Agassi, the combined use of individualism,institutionalism and situational logic is the characteristic mark of allserious work in social science and history.I agree that Popper’s institutionalism, combined with situational logic, is animportant contribution to the methodology of the social sciences. I also agreethat it represents a via media between psychologistic individualism and theextreme view that wholes have aims and interests of their own. I even agree that