Methodological Individualism

2 Introductionwas often told that the debate about it was over. Several sociologists tried topersuade me that arguments against methodological individualism advanced bySteven Lukes and others are so strong as to render methodological individualisma mere curiosity, or at least harmless. The main point of Lukes was that it is vainto discuss methodological individualism without making clear what conceptionof ‘individuals’ you are using (Lukes, 1968; see also Burman, 1979). His argumentwas addressed in part to the methodological individualist, J.W.N Watkins,who had argued that methodological individualism is, or follows, from the ontological‘truism’ that ‘[a]ll social phenomena are, directly or indirectly, humancreations’ (Watkins, 1952a: 28).Today, we know that the debate about methodological individualists was notover. With the recent upsurge of rational choice, a new wave of methodologicalindividualism has swept the social sciences. One of the most influential advocatesof this approach, Jon Elster (1986b: 66; 1989b: 13), 3 has recently repeatedWatkins’s claim that methodological individualism is trivially true, but since it isimpossible for a methodology to be at all true, I suppose that Elster really meansmetaphysical, or ontological, individualism. 4 J.W.N. Watkins was more correcton this point, at least, since he recognised that his truism is an ontological thesisrather than a methodological rule. But, as he later himself admitted (1952b:186f), he was nevertheless wrong to assume that the latter follows from theformer. Even if ontological individualism is trivially true, it does not follow thatmethodological individualism is the only, or even the best, way to explain allsocial phenomena (Lukes, 1968; Kinkaid, 1997: 4, 16f). As Ernest Gellner (1956:176) put it some time ago, with respect to history: ‘History is about chaps. It doesnot follow that its explanations are always in terms of chaps’. Today, it is fairlycommon to accept ontological individualism, but deny methodological individualism.5I am not going to argue against ontological individualism, here, but I denythat it is trivially true. It is only if stated in a trivial enough way, that ontologicalindividualism is true, but this says little, or nothing, about the real issues involvedin the debate about it (cf. Miller, 1978; 1987: 115). If, for instance, methodologicalindividualism is only intended to deny that society is literally an organismendowed with a mind, or consciousness, which exists apart from the minds ofindividuals, then, it is of course true, but as Miller points out, even the archholist,Hegel, maintained that the world spirit is manifested in the actions ofindividual human beings and nowhere else. 6 Also, to suggest that the ‘truth’ ofmethodological individualism is secured by the fact that social wholes are madeup of individuals and their relations to one another is to beg the fundamentallyimportant questions: ‘What is an individual?’ and ‘What is a social relation?’ 7The issue between methodological individualists and their critics, then, isgenuine, but this does not mean that the debate has always been about the realissues involved. Far from it. There has been too much confusion surrounding themeaning and implications of the two positions, for a really fruitful debate to takeplace. This sad fact, has, no doubt, contributed to create the impression of asham battle. To an astonishing degree, the disputants have argued at cross-