Methodological Individualism

210 Popperian methodological individualismcommon with that of Weber, Mises and Hayek. Like his precursors, Popperadvances methodological individualism in direct opposition to the naive belief ofcollectivism or methodological essentialism that social objects exist apart from themodels used to construct and to analyse them. In a nominalist, or instrumentalist,fashion Popper holds that social objects are abstractions, or theoretical constructions.Only individual human beings are concrete objects. Methodologicalindividualism is stated as the principle that social phenomena (collectives, institutions,traditions) should be (a) analysed in terms of, (b) reduced to, or (c)understood as resulting from the attitudes, expectations, actions, interactions andrelations of individuals. In particular, it is the task of social theory to explain theexistence and functioning of institutions and social collectives in terms of theintended and unintended consequences of the social actions of individuals.One important difference between Popper and the Austrians is that he ismuch less interested in the meaning of concepts, including collective concepts.For Popper, methodological individualism is not at all about the meaning ofcollective concepts. It is about the explanation of social phenomena.Another difference is that Popper, more explicitly than his Austrian predecessors,advances methodological individualism as a categorical imperative, valid apriori and universally applicable to the social sciences and to history.Methodological individualism is stated, by Popper as the ‘postulate’, ‘demand’,or ‘unassailable doctrine’ that social phenomena ‘should’, or ‘must always’ beanalysed, or understood, in terms of individuals, etc.The main difference between Popper and the Austrians, however, is thatPopper rejects the subjectivism of the latter. Methodological individualism is nolonger a corollary of an intersubjective theory of society. According to Popper,subjectivism leads to psychologism and, ultimately, to a genetic concern with theorigins of society. In order to avoid this predicament, Popper adopts institutionalism.What is more, institutions are conceived of as objective elements of socialreality, not as ideas in the minds of individuals. This creates a tension in Popper’ssocial science methodology which is not easily resolved (cf. Bunge, 1996b: 533;1999: 107f). I have argued that methodological individualism and institutionalism,as stated by Popper, are irreconcilable doctrines. Institutionalism is anaddition to methodological individualism, which does not fit in; a young cuckoowhich eventually replaces methodological individualism as the substantive partof Popper’s social science methodology. I believe that Popper, when fully appreciatingthe consequences of his commitment to institutionalism, silently droppedmethodological individualism, while retaining institutionalism and situationalanalysis as the main elements of his social science methodology.Nevertheless, the tension between individualism and institutionalism inPopper’s thought leads his followers in somewhat different directions. J.W.N.Watkins stays on the individualist side, while Joseph Agassi and I.C. Jarvie try tosit on the fence, but finally come down on the institutionalist side. This is alsowhere Popper eventually lands with his theory of the objective mind.