Methodological Individualism

Positivism in philosophy and social science 195theory of social exchange so as to apply also to social networks (1972b). Fromthen on, Emerson and his colleagues were mainly concerned with experimentalresearch on relations of power in exchange networks (Cook and Emerson, 1978;Cook, Emerson and Gillmore, 1983).In the meantime, a parallel development took place around the so-calledelementary theory of David Willer and his colleagues. Taking their point ofdeparture in classical structuralist sociology (Willer and Andersson, 1981; Willer,1992), rather than in social exchange theory, they arrived at an approach similarto that of Emerson and his followers. In a well-known article from 1988,Markovsky, Patton and Willer criticised the analysis and results obtained byCook, Emerson and Gilmore. This led to a further exchange between the twogroups of researchers, but despite the disagreement between them, there was ageneral feeling that both groups were united in a common project: that ofcreating a new field of social research. The name of the new field became‘network exchange theory’ (see Bienenstock and Bonacich, 1997).This new version of social exchange theory is different from that of Homansin two important respects: it includes a distinctive structuralist element and it hasreplaced behaviourist psychology by rational choice. The latest developmentseems to be the use of game theory to analyse the exchange between individualsin power relations (Willer, 1992; Willer and Skvoretz, 1997; Markovsky, 1997).This transformation of social exchange theory has led to a rapprochementwith two other theoretical traditions in the USA: the network theory of HarrisonWhite and followers, and the rational choice based theory of social exchangedeveloped by James S. Coleman. 35 The former tradition is characterised by astrong commitment to structuralism, which leaves little room for individualistmicrofoundations (White, Boorman and Breiger, 1976; White, 1992: 3, 298,passim; Wellman and Berkowitz (eds), 1988). An exception is Mark Granovetter,who makes frequent use of rational choice as a microfoundation in his analysesof networks (1973; 1978).The second tradition is more individualistic, but does not neglect social structures,as did Homans (see, e.g., Burt, 1982). Coleman, himself, is committed tomethodological individualism, but, as we will see in chapter 10, it is a weak formof individualism, including also an important structuralist element. Coleman’smethodological individualism is, I believe, identical with the structuralindividualismdefended by some Dutch sociologists (see p. 199).Network exchange theory is closer to Coleman’s theory of exchange than tothe network theory of Harrison White. Like the former, it combines actiontheory and structuralism. There is a certain ambiguity on this point in theEmerson approach. 36 According to Cook (1991: 32): ‘The goal was to constructa theory of social exchange in which social structure is the dependent variable’(see also Cook, 1987: 214). Support for this claim can be found in Emerson(1972b: 58). But there is also abundant evidence that both Emerson and Cookuse social structure as independent variable. This is fundamental to the theory ofpower dependence, which sees power as a function, or effect, of the position