Methodological Individualism

324 Why methodological individualism?indivisible, and it was maintained by the Greek atomists that everything else isdivisible, and made up of atoms. Applied to society, it is usually assumed that theatom is the human individual. All social phenomena are aggregates, collections,or complexes, of individual human beings. The term ‘atomism’ is often used, insocial science, to denote the idea of an ‘isolated individual’, but this is not theonly use of the term. When Carl Menger talked about an ‘atomist method’ andMax Weber conceived of the individual as the atom of analysis, they did notmean the ‘isolated individual’.In previous chapters we have seen that many methodological individualistsreject ‘realism’ and invoke ‘nominalism’ in defence of methodological individualism.Indeed, in early sociology, methodological individualism was often calledsociological nominalism, as opposed to sociological realism. Nominalism is thedoctrine that only particulars exist. Universals are all in the mind. Applied tosociety, this means that only individuals exist, while social collectives are fabricationsof the mind.A third doctrine, which is often mentioned in discussions about methodologicalindividualism, is monadology. This doctrine derives from the Germanphilosopher G.W. Leibniz and is a German counterpart of atomism. Themonad, like the atom is the smallest part of the universe and indivisible. It differsfrom the atom by being endowed with a mind. This mind reflects, in itself, thewhole of the universe and is, in this respect a microcosmos. It is clear that theintersubjectivist theory of society discussed in chapter 5 is influenced byLeibniz’s monadology. Also Jon Elster, seems to conceive of society as made upof monads (see p. 313).ReductionismIt is common to see methodological individualism as a form of reductionism andmany methodological individualists accept this view. But not all, as we shall see.Very much depends upon the answer to the question: Reduction to what? Anatural answer would be psychology, but some methodological individualists,e.g., Weber and Popper, deny that methodological individualism is identical withpsychologism. In the case of Popper, this denial is based on his institutionalism,which is, indeed incompatible with psychologism. But it is still possible to maintainthat the strong version of methodological individualism is identical withpsychologism.Scientific reduction‘Reduction’, as here understood, means elimination without remainder. Thereduced theory (or science) is eliminated and replaced by, or incorporated in, thereducing theory (or science). This is how the term ‘reduction’ was originally usedby philosophers of science. ‘After a theory has been reduced to another itbecomes, in a sense, expendable. This is the heart of the matter’ (Bergmann,1957: 166). Or, in the words of Kinkaid (1997: 14), the ‘root notion behind