Methodological Individualism

Why methodological individualism? 339is for the former a metaphysical presupposition, and for the latter a politicalideal; a view of society as made up of autonomous agents interacting with eachother (making contracts) for their mutual benefit. 29 The actual society mostclosely approximating this ideal society – ‘ideal’ both in the epistemological andethical sense of that term – is the free market society of early capitalism, if thereever was a free market society (cf. Weber, 1949: 44). It is no coincidence thatorthodox economics is both the theory of that society and the most often citedexample of methodological individualism (cf. Schotter, 1985: 1ff).Methodological individualism and liberalism also have an epistemologicalargument in common. Methodological individualism denies that we can haveknowledge about society as a whole or as a totality. But if we cannot have suchknowledge, then, central planning and ‘utopian social engineering’ become, ifnot impossible, then at least dangerous, since we are left in the dark as to theconsequences of such large-scale political measures. Under these circumstances,a free market economy seems preferable to a centrally planned economy and,according to some methodological individualists, also to state interventionismand the modern welfare state. 30HumanismThe supreme perfection of man is that he acts freely or voluntarily, and it isthis, which makes him deserve praise or blame.(Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol 1: 205)A basic idea of individualism, and of Western thought in general, is that ofhuman freedom; the idea of man as an autonomous being capable of acting rationallyin the pursuit of her own interests. Closely related to the idea of freedom isthat of the dignity of ‘man’. Man alone among the creatures of the earth is freeand rational, created in the image of God. This godlike nature of man is theultimate source of his/her dignity. From the freedom and rationality of manfollows his/her responsibility. From the dignity of man derives his/her naturaland inalienable rights (Lukes, 1973: 43ff).This conception of man originates in Greek Antiquity and finds its mostgenuine expression in Renaissance humanism. In a secularised version, it is thedominant conception of man also in contemporary Western thought, commonsenseincluded. Considering the privileged place it assigns to humankind, thisview is better characterised as ‘humanism’ than as ‘individualism’. In order todistinguish this form of humanism from other forms, I will call it ‘individualisthumanism’. 31Individualist humanism is not a necessary accompaniment to methodologicalindividualism. It is possible to accept the latter without accepting the former, aswitnessed by the existence of behaviourist methodological individualism (see pp.190–9). We may speak, therefore, of a humanist individualism in addition to anindividualist humanism. But if individualist humanism does not follow from