Methodological Individualism

370 Notes23 All articles referred to in my presentation of Schutz’s phenomenological sociology,except ‘The Social World and the Theory of Action’, can be found in Alfred Schutz,Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality (1962).24 See Schutz, (1945a: 542–5; 1953: 11–14; 1955: 164–6, 193–207).25 As we saw in chapter 3 (p. 69), the idea of ‘second-order concepts’ goes back toWilhelm Dilthey, who intended roughly the same thing as Schutz by his ‘concepts ofsecond degree’. Schutz does not refer to Dilthey, so it is impossible to say if heborrowed the idea of concepts of second degree from him.26 I think, of course, of the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser and his followers.27 Merleau-Ponty read the manuscript to Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences in 1939,and saw in it a break with Husserl’s earlier transcendental phenomenology. His ownexistentialist phenomenology is largely based on Husserl’s idea of a life-world. SeeMerleau-Ponty, ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’ (1947) and ‘ThePhilosopher and Sociology’ (1960) (both in Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 247–79; 95–110).28 See Bourdieu (1990: ch. 1) for information on the intellectual scene in France in the1960s. Bourdieu’s favourable attitude to Merleau-Ponty has probably much to do withthe importance attached to the body in his main work Phenomenology of Perception(1945). As is well known, also Bourdieu attaches much importance to the body in hissociology.29 See also Craib (1976), Douglas and Johnson, eds (1977) and Kotarba and Fontana,eds (1984).30 On the relation between Garfinkel and Parsons, see Heritage (1987: 226–32). See alsoSharrock and Andersson (1986: 23–38), who argue that Garfinkel did not intend tobelittle the contribution of Parsons and never rejected it wholesale. See alsoAlexander (1987: 252ff), who suggests that Garfinkel was driven into a more radicalrejection of Parsons by his more radical followers. It has also been maintained thatethnomethodology is the result of an unsuccessful attempt to create a synthesis of theincompatible theories of Parsons and Schutz (Rogers, 1983: 133–6), but this is probablyto exaggerate the influence of Parsons on ethnomethodology.31 Like Blumer, with regard to the term ‘symbolic interactionism’, Garfinkel refuses totake any responsibility for the use of the term ‘ethnomethodology’. While few woulddeny that Garfinkel is the origin, both of the term and the theoretical movement, it isalso clear that it has developed in different directions and become increasinglyheterogenous (see, e.g. Douglas, 1971: 32–5; Attewell, 1974: 182ff; Zimmerman,1978: 6–8).32 See, e.g., Habermas, ([1970] 1988: 109ff; [1981] 1984: 224–30); Mayerl (1973: 276),Wolff (1979: 532–40), Sharrock and Andersson (1986: ch. 1), and Collin (1997: 28)on the influence of phenomenology. See, however, Zimmerman (1978: 6–8), whowishes to play down the dependence of ethnomethodology on phenomenology.33 My view that ethnomethodology belongs with both phenomenology and symbolicinteractionism, as a version of the interactionist and subjectivist, or interpretive,theory of society, seems to be shared by Douglas (1971: 12ff), Habermas ([1970]1988: 109ff; [1981] 1984: 124–30) and Knorr-Cetina (1981: 1ff).34 See Giddens (1979: 172–8), Lemert (1979) and Bleicher (1982: 126–30).35 On the ethnomethodological view of society as a process, see also Attewell (1974:201–5).36 See Cicourel (1964: 197ff; 1974: 13–28), Manning (1971: 244–51) and Zimmerman(1971).37 See Attewell (1974: 196), Skidmore ([1975] 1979: 236f, 255–58), Collins (1981: 85f)and Bleicher (1982: 135f).38 SeeHabermas([1981]1984:92–117;[1981]1987:124–31)andAlexander(1987:271ff).39 On the role of pre-understanding for understanding in ethnomethodology, seeMehan and Wood (1975: 365–67). Bleicher (1982: 135f), who also notes the similaritiesbetween ethnomethodology and hermeneutics, nevertheless observes that, at a