Methodological Individualism

214 Popperian methodological individualisminvalidate the assumption on which the principle of methodological individualismrests. For they operate either by altering (and sometimes destroying)people, or through people’s ideas about them. In either case it is people whodetermine history, however people themselves are determined. Now if socialevents like inflation, political revolution, ‘the disappearance of the middleclasses,’ etc., are brought about by people, then they must be explained interms of people; in terms of the situations people confront and the ambitions,fears and ideas which activate them. In short, large-scale socialphenomena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions and beliefsof individuals. This I call methodological individualism.(Watkins, 1955a: 58)So far, Watkins has only achieved a restatement of his earlier version ofmethodological individualism, but with an ambiguous relation to its ontologicalbasis. The ambiguity consists in the fact that he, on the one hand, argues that itis ‘speaking loosely’ to say that physical factors help to determine history, and, onthe other hand, says that the situation helps to explain social phenomena.Unless, of course, Watkins intends by the ‘situation’ only other individuals. Buteven so, he runs into trouble, since also other individuals exert only an indirectinfluence upon the actions of a particular individual. So, it would seem, Watkinswill either have to admit ‘loose speaking’ in the explanation of socialphenomena, or else, omit any mention of the situation in his statement ofmethodological individualism.Watkins also breeds confusion by seemingly changing methodological individualismfrom a principle concerning the explanation of social phenomena into athesis about the meaning of concepts. When, in his polemic with Brodbeck, hegoes on to discuss the relation of concepts such as ‘group climate’ and ‘cohesiveness’to the principle of methodological individualism, it turns into a thesis aboutthe meaning of holistic concepts.I do not see how such concepts can be meaningful and yet involve no referenceto individuals. If ‘The Jewish race is cohesive’ does not mean that, forinstance, Jews usually marry Jews, live in close communities, share religiousrituals, etc., if it does not refer to Jewish people (whose behaviour can beobserved), then I do not see how it can be tested or have any empiricalcontent.(Watkins, 1955a: 61)Concern with concepts seems to be a temporary aberration, however. Watkins’sfinal word on this matter is decidedly against a preoccupation with the meaningof concepts.I should have realized, when I insisted that all large-scale happenings are, inprinciple, individualistically explainable, that there are many social methodologistswho concern themselves with the uninteresting question of