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tainable levels. Illegal fishing remains
problematic, though some progress has
been made. For example, the number
of incidents in which Chinese vessels
were caught fishing illegally by South
Korea peaked in 2005 at 584, then
decreased each year through 2010 (363
incidents) before rising again to at least
440 in 2011. Both Chinese and South
Korean officials and experts attribute
the overall decrease to greater efforts
on the part of the Chinese to stem the
problem through education and alternative
employment opportunities.
Why, then, have we seen a number of
high-profile security incidents related to
fisheries recently? In September 2010,
a Chinese fishing vessel clashed with
two Japanese coast guard vessels near
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
The scuffle resulted in the apprehension
of the Chinese captain by Japanese
authorities, an embargo on rare earth
exports (minerals and metals needed
for smartphones and other advanced
technology) from China to Japan and a
cooling in China-Japan relations. A few
months later, another skirmish between
Chinese fishing vessels and the South
Korean coast guard took place in the
Yellow Sea, resulting in the death of
three Chinese fishermen. In June 2011,
a Chinese fishing boat collided with an
exploration cable from a Vietnamese
seismic survey vessel, and the incident
was followed by Vietnamese protests. In
December 2011, a Chinese fisherman
on a vessel operating illegally stabbed
two South Korean coast guard officers,
killing one and wounding the other.
Some analysts believe these conflicts
are part of China’s grand strategy in
Asia, though an alternative explanation
points to the effects of domestic political
dynamics. Conflicting signals and priorities
between the central and local government
are contributing to the occurrence
of these incidents. The central
government has an interest in preserving
China’s national sovereignty, but it also
strives to maintain good diplomatic relations
with neighboring countries—not
least to provide a stable environment for
China’s economic development.
At the provincial level, however,
local officials are concerned primarily
with economic performance, for which
they are accountable to the central
government. Therefore, fishermen are
encouraged to catch as much as possible.
Because fish are scarcer in Chinese
coastal waters, the country’s vessels are
venturing farther to fish and into waters
the central government says they have
a right to be in—where they come into
conflict with neighboring countries.
Add to this a bit of Chinese Communist
Party insecurity over China’s 2012
leadership succession, and one result
is a more aggressive response to some
of these conflicts so the Chinese state
appears strong to its citizens.
China’s bilateral fishery spats with
Japan, South Korea and Vietnam
have a very real historical and diplomatic
dimension. The long-fraught
relationship with Japan had been
slowly improving since 2006, but the
recent conflict was a serious setback.
Unless the situation improves through
confidence-building measures such as
dialogue over reconciliation, such disputes
about resources, including fisheries,
are likely to continue. China’s foundation
with South Korea is in markedly
better shape, and when clashes over
fisheries happen, they are less apt to
spill over and negatively affect the
overall relationship. The historical connection
between China and Vietnam
is also a difficult one, though conflicts
with Vietnam must be set in the larger
context of the South China Sea.
The dispute over the South China
Sea is mainly over who controls sea
lines of communication and the abundant
hydrocarbon resources believed
present in the seabed. But disputes over
these resources are diverting attention
away from what is the more important
resource in the area—the rich fisheries
on which coastal communities along
the South China Sea basin heavily
depend. Whereas the estimated hydrocarbon
resources are not a long-term
energy solution, the fisheries are renew-
able if they can be managed. China
has been dispatching fisheries law
enforcement vessels to patrol the waters
around the Paracel and Spratly Islands
for illegal fishing, though many people
suspect Chinese authorities are using
the fisheries as an excuse to assert control
over the South China Sea through
civilian instead of direct military means.
Distant Seas
Because of these growing pressures
on fisheries in China’s near seas, the
country has shifted its efforts toward
developing distant-water fishing. China
believes it deserves its “fair share” of
global fish stocks and sees distantwater
fishing as a way to increase its
ocean presence globally. The country
maintains that distant-water fishing is
an important part of its official “going
out” strategy—a strategy detailed in
the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–05),
which encourages Chinese companies
to search for new markets and invest
abroad. Through preferential tax treatments
and fuel offsets, China subsidizes
its distant-water fishing fleets to fish on
China’s distant-water fishing strategy is potentially problematic.
Fish stocks around the world are already severely threatened,
which has negative implications for the livelihoods of
subsistence-level coastal communities.
the high seas and in the EEZs of other
countries. It is working to expand the
size and technology of its distant-water
fleets, already the largest in the world
(although its fleet technology is inferior
to that of developed countries) and is
making plans to exploit nontraditional
fisheries such as Antarctic krill.
But China’s distant-water fishing
strategy is potentially problematic. Fish
stocks around the world are already
severely threatened, which has negative
implications for the livelihoods of
subsistence-level coastal communities.
For example, China has nearly
400 fishing vessels in 10 West African
countries through bilateral fisheriesaccess
agreements with these countries.
But some West African governments,
heavily dependent on licensing fees for
their national budgets, may be issuing
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