WHOI-90-52

tageted "fallbacks". These are coasta development projects, including airprts and urban
developments in the nea-shore zone. These projects are primarly civil engineering and not
related to the development of high-tech instrmentation. Thus they wil not necssaly present
an opportunity for the sae of U.S. MEI manufactures. But neither wil they necssaly result
in the development of instruments to compete with U.S. manufactures.
In the Unite States, there has been a tendency to view the Japanese style of government-industr
coordination as a guarantee of succss. But this is not necssaly the case. Using the Japanese
deep sebed mining large-sce project as an example, R&D tagets are not immune to worldwide
economic conditions. Moreover, there are indications in this field that tageting and invisible
barers are necssa for the Japanese to build up tehnologica capabilties. (A recnt Japanese
government RFP for sebeam tehnology appes to have been wired speificaly for a Japanese
company with no production history in this technology.) Thus U.S. firms still may have
technologica advantages in many areas.
There exist constitutional barers to the sae of defense technologies, such as ASW systems,
which may give U.S. firms a competitive advantage in international defense markets. The
resilence of this advantage is subject to question, however.
Finally, many of the success stories head from U.S. firms about penetration into the Japanese
market almost always concern either an affiliation with a Japanese firm (to circumvent problems
with distrbution channels) or a case where the U.S. product mimics existing Japanese products
(to comply with the strong preference of Japanese consumers for Japanese products). We hope
to examine these conclusions in greater depth during a series of interviews with Japanese
government and industry officials in the nea .future.
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