Volume 1 - Discourses - Books I - II - College of Stoic Philosophers

BOOK I. XL 7-15conduct is in accordance with nature. I cannot,said the man ; but do you rather show me how it isnot in accordance with nature, and not rightly done.And Epictetus said :Well, if we were enquiringabout white and black objects, what sort of criterionshould we summon in. order to distinguish betweenthem? The sight, said the man And if abouthot and cold, and hard and soft objects, whatcriterion? The touch. Very well,, then, since weare disputing about things which are in accordancewith nature and things which are rightly or notrightly done, what criterion would you have ustake? I do not know r ,he said. And yet, thoughit is, perhaps, no great harm for one not to knowthe criterion of colours and odours, and so, too, offlavours, still do you think that it is a slight harmfor a man to be ignorant of the criterion of goodand evil things, and of those in accordance withnature and those contrary to nature ? On the contrary,it is the very greatest harm. Come, tell me,are all the things that certain persons regard asgood and fitting, rightly so ?regarded And is itpossible at this present time that all the opinionswhich Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians and Romanshold on the subject of food are rightly held? Andhow can it be possible? But, I fancy, it is absolutelynecessary, if the views of the Egyptians are right,that those of the others are not right if;those ofthe Jews are well founded, that those of the othersare not. Yes, certainly. Now where there isignorance, there is also lack of knowledge and thelack of instruction in matters which are indispensable.He agreed. You, then, said lie, now thatyou perceive this, will henceforth study no other81VOL. I.G