Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ã bo Akademi

Mozaffar also points out that political conditions and traditions restrict the range ofchoices for political actors. Decisions on electoral rules are certainly implementedby politicians but the contextual environment sets certain limits on the freedom ofchoice. “Institutional choice is”, in Mozaffar’s words, “tempered by the structuralhistoricalcontext that defines the conflicting interests and power relations ofcontending actors, informs their institutional preferences, and constrains theirstrategies in bargaining over new electoral systems” (1998: 81).Birch, Millard, Popescu and Williams (2002) deal with the interest of politicalactors as one of four basic approaches to electoral system design. Most actors areassumed to have self-interested goals in addition to their obligation towardspromoting the collective good. Again, reference is made to Rokkan (1970): majorelectoral reforms occur when an alternative system is likely to produce larger seatshare for one or several parties that have the power to implement an electoralreform. Two different classifications apply: interest-based models can beclassified, first, according to the types of actors assumed to be involved in thedecision-making process, and, second, according to the goals those actors are heldto seek. A difference is also made between strategic decision-making at thefounding stage and post-zero-stage bargaining. A large degree of uncertainty aboutelectoral outcomes prevails when a new state emerges or when a transitional periodis in progress. After the first elections under the new electoral system, the strategiccontext is altered. Uncertainty decreases, actors become better aware of how topursue their interests, and successful contestants become institutionally embeddedin the legislative structures. Another electoral reform may well take place betweenthese two stages, but thereafter, electoral systems are expected to become ‘sticky’(2002: 16-22).A few years ago, Boix wrote that there are yet only two seminal works on whatcauses the high degree of cross-national variations in electoral laws. These areCitizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processesof Development by Rokkan (1970) and ‘Trade and Democratic Institutions’ byRogowski (1987). Boix (1999) emphasizes the different strategies that politicalactors pursue, depending on certain conditions and constellations. His theory of theselection of electoral systems is largely based on the ‘Rokkan hypothesis’.However, Boix argues that Rokkan’s argument is under-specified. Rokkan doesnot indicate the conditions under which policymakers will feel sufficiently90