Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ã bo Akademi

threatened to change the current electoral rules. Why, for instance, did Britainintroduce universal suffrage without adopting PR (as did Denmark and Sweden)?Why have certain countries shifted back and forth between majoritarian and PRsystems during the last century? A third problem, according to Boix, is thatRokkan’s explanation is too historically bounded. The adoption of PR in Europe acentury ago is associated with the rise of socialism – a factor that is not relevant toelectoral system choice in post-authoritarian Latin America, post-CommunistEastern Europe and democratizing countries today (Boix 1999: 610).In his study of electoral system choice in 23 developed democracies, Boix showsthat electoral systems derive from the decisions that the ruling parties make tomaximize their representation. As long as the electoral arena remains unchangedand the ruling parties are favored by the current rules, the electoral system is notaltered. As the electoral arena changes, electoral reform becomes desirable for theruling parties. The type of electoral reform that is preferred depends on the strengthof the new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties. When the newparties are weak, the majoritarian system is maintained. When the new entrants arestrong, a PR system is adopted if no old party enjoys a dominant position.However, if there is a dominant old party, an electoral system change is not likelyto take place (Boix 1999: 609-624). Electoral system choice is, hence, determinedby strategic calculations of the old-established parties. These calculations are, inturn, based on suffrage extension, the electoral arena, and power constellationsbetween the old parties internally as well as between old and new parties.This work is not concerned with strategic calculations of political actors ordecision-making concerning the adoption of electoral systems. Nevertheless, theprevailing conditions in the bargaining process are related to a structuraldimension, namely the party system, which is relevant to the present study. Theaforesaid suggests that the result of a negotiating process with two maincompetitors – or in other words, two main political parties – will most likely be amajoritarian system. Likewise, we may expect a proportional system to be adopted,if many participants – i.e. many political parties – take part in the decision-makingprocess. In other words, the structure of the party system may be regarded as anexplanatory factor. The party system is consequently both an actor-related and astructurally generated problem. It is primary an actor-related matter and secondarya structural phenomenon, because the party system consists of political parties that91