Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ã bo Akademi

members are called Senators but they nonetheless work side by side with thedirectly elected members in a single chamber. According to Karvonen (2003: 122),these legislatures do not qualify as bicameral. A separate election to both chambersis a prerequisite of bicameralism. As for the upper house, appointment methods arealso used. What matters is that representatives stand for the legislative office andare elected to one of the two chambers.There is, however, a great deal of variety among bicameral systems. In somebicameral countries, the upper house is politically insignificant and almostpowerless, whereas in others, both chambers are equally powerful. Differences are,in other words, largely manifested in symmetrical and asymmetrical forms ofbicameralism. The power constellation between the chambers is dependent onseveral factors. First, the pattern of recruitment varies between upper houses. If theupper house is elected at-large in national elections according to the ‘one man, onevote’ –principle, both chambers represent the same interests and cannot beexpected to behave very differently from each other. Asymmetrical bicameralismprevails. In several countries, however, the upper house represents regions insteadof citizens. Indeed, one of the main reasons for having an upper house is to helpresolve regional differences in countries which are geographically large and/orsocially and culturally diverse. The upper house is rather often deliberately overrepresentedto reduce the threat of ‘tyranny by the majority’. The most obviousexample is the United States where each state, regardless of size, has two senators.In addition to region, representation in the upper house may be based on ethnicity,language, religion or occupational group. Moreover, bicameral countries differwith respect to legislative procedures. In some countries, both chambers mayinitiate legislation, whereas in others, this right is reserved for the lower houseonly. In case of conflict between the chambers, two principal solutions apply:either the lower house has decisive decision-making power or both chambers havemutual veto, which force them to some kind of adjustment procedures.The apparent question is whether these differences should be considered in theanalysis of possible patterns between chamber structure and electoral systemchoice. Can we expect countries with symmetrical bicameralism to be in need ofother electoral provisions than countries with asymmetrical bicameralism? Ifchamber structure is relevant to electoral system choice, the most fundamentaldividing line is that between bicameral and unicameral countries, i.e. the existence140