Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ãbo Akademi

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Country Colonial Regional Form <strong>of</strong> Territorial Chamberlegacy diffusion government organization structureCentral A. R. (1998) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralChad (1960) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralChad (1996) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralComoros (1978) France no non-democratic federal unicameralCongo (-Br.) (1960) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralCongo (-Br.) (1992) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralCongo (-Kin.) (1960) Belgium no non-democratic federal bicameralCongo (-Kin.) (1967) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralCongo (-Kin.) (1977) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralCongo (-Kin.) (1982) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralCote d'Ivoire (1960) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralCote d'Ivoire (1980) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralCote d'Ivoire (1985) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralCroatia (1991) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralCroatia (1999) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralCuba (1992) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralCyprus (1960) UK no presidential unitary unicameralCyprus (1981) no yes presidential unitary unicameralCzechoslov. (1990) no yes non-democratic federal bicameralCzech Rep. (1993) no yes parliamentary unitary bicameralDjibouti (1977) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralDominica (1978) UK no parliamentary unitary unicameralDominican R. (1962) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralEast Timor (2002) Indonesia no non-democratic unitary unicameralEcuador (1946) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralEcuador (1978) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralEgypt (1950) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralEgypt (1983) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralEgypt (1986) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralEgypt (1990) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralEl Salvador (1963) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralEquatorial G. (1968) no yes non-democratic federal unicameralEquatorial G. (1993) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralEstonia (1992) no yes hybrid unitary unicameralEthiopia (1955) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralFiji (1970) UK no parliamentary unitary bicameralFiji (1999) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralFrance (1945) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralFrance (1951) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralFrance (1958) no no semi-presidential unitary bicameralFrance (1986) no no semi-presidential unitary bicameralFrance (1988) no no semi-presidential unitary bicameralGabon (1960) France no presidential unitary unicameralGabon (1990) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralGambia (1965) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameralGeorgia (1992) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralGermany (E) (1949) no no non-democratic unitary no infoGermany (E) (1990) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralGermany (W) (1949) no no non-democratic federal bicameralGhana (1957) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameral256
Country Colonial Regional Form <strong>of</strong> Territorial Chamberlegacy diffusion government organization structureGreece (1952) no no parliamentary unitary unicameralGreece (1956) no no parliamentary unitary unicameralGreece (1958) no yes parliamentary unitary unicameralGrenada (1974) UK no parliamentary unitary bicameralGuatemala (1946) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralGuatemala (1956) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralGuinea (1963) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralGuinea (1990) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralGuinea-Bis. (1976) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralGuinea-Bis. (1994) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralGuyana (1966) no yes semi-presidential unitary unicameralHaiti (1995) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralHonduras (1957) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralHungary (1966) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralHungary (1989) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralIceland (1959) no yes semi-presidential unitary unicameralIndia (1950) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameralIndonesia (1953) Netherlands no non-democratic unitary unicameralIran (1963) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralIran (1979) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralIraq (1952) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralIraq (1995) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralIsrael (1948) no no parliamentary unitary unicameralItaly (1953) no yes parliamentary unitary bicameralItaly (1954) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralItaly (1993) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralJamaica (1962) UK no parliamentary unitary bicameralJapan (1946) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralJapan (1993) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralJordan (1947) UK no non-democratic unitary bicameralJordan (1993) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralKazakhstan (1993) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKazakhstan (1995) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralKazakhstan (1999) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralKenya (1963) UK no non-democratic federal bicameralKiribati (1978) no no hybrid unitary unicameralKorea (N) (1948) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKorea (S) (1948) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKorea (S) (1963) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKorea (S) (1973) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKorea (S) (1980) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralKuwait (1962) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameralKyrgyzstan (1994) Soviet Union no non-democratic unitary bicameralKyrgyzstan (1999) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralLaos (1953) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralLaos (1960) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralLaos (1965) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameralLatvia (1993) no yes parliamentary unitary unicameralLebanon (1953) no yes semi-presidential unitary unicameralLesotho (1966) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameral257
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Krister LundellContextual Determina
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CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORA
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CIP Cataloguing in PublicationLunde
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at Åbo Akademi University, the Fac
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3.2 Explanations of Electoral Syste
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9. CONCLUSION 2239.1 The Rational P
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politics. Both approaches bear rele
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electoral system choice as an epoch
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1.2 The Importance of Electoral Sys
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Within the range of democratic inst
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will depend on the specific cleavag
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Before describing different voting
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2.1.1 Ballot StructureThe ballot st
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formula, and the variety of elector
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ather be regarded as a characterist
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2.2.1 Plurality Systems2.2.1.1 Sing
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mixture of BV and PBV. In my classi
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Weaver 1984: 198-199). CV implies t
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total election, often pull out of t
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disadvantage is that it presupposes
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parties and minority groups. Furthe
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simultaneously avoiding disproporti
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and Blais. They also agree that the
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Whether one formula applies or not
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difficult. Even an independent comb
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attention to all three main dimensi
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(national, regional and local lists
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The degree of proportionality also
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variables: ethnic and cultural dive
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smallest category, representing 15
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democracies. 12 Nevertheless, the g
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(Vanuatu) are represented by merely
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKIn this cha
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ecognition of opposing views in the
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systems. If we reformulate the ques
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the rules, the lack of knowledge is
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not. Consequently, their analysis c
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proportional electoral systems. He
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groups as possible, to avoid attemp
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associated with certain features an
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also called electoral engineering.
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(2002: 14). Public opinion, often e
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Similar reform societies were estab
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systematically favor or disfavor ce
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interests based on ascriptive commu
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argues, both majorities and minorit
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A more popular form of recognizing
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Among the three basic majoritarian
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politics. When universal suffrage w
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and no electoral threshold in order
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threatened to change the current el
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inadequate since electoral systems
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electoral reform is likely to occur
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main advocates of proportional repr
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whereas majoritarian systems prevai
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The rational learning model sees po
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3.2.4.1 Colonial LegacyColonial leg
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Different colonial powers administe
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The Australian and American colonia
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epresented the “wave of the democ
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The second wave of democratization
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parliamentary elections, particular
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parliamentary or presidential gover
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measure of ethnic and cultural dive
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medium size. The other 40 per cent
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size and electoral systems, two str
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that have previously held general e
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The association between party syste
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democratization process. Neverthele
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The occurrence of list PR in former
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Third, an electoral system must exi
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Three matters are of interest in co
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according to Lijphart’s definitio
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3.3.3.2 Territorial OrganizationA n
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to the whole territory. Countries a
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or non-existence of an ‘additiona
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subset of the world’s countries,
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Concerning data on party system fra
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22). 30 Nevertheless, the coded yea
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(1) free and fair elections of the
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(e.g. 1984; 1990). The index is bas
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standards and Mauritius was democra
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Table 5.1. Ethnic and cultural frag
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Table 5.4. Ethnic and cultural frag
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values. Each integer of the logarit
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is also quite large, and therefore
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1966, and Cyprus 1981. Suriname ado
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significant. 36 The large standard
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small standard deviation values ind
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samples with changes to mixed syste
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a consequence of the party system t
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eplace plurality systems with mixed
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former British colonies did not inh
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Table 6.2. Colonial legacy and elec
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impact on the dependent variable wh
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(1993). All these countries adopted
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On the basis of figure 2.1 in secti
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their electoral systems. Bulgaria a
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as a general determinant of institu
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The average population size among c
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Only two federal states chose elect
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any major role. Regional diffusion,
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Plurality systems dominate the thir
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inherit the plurality system but al
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popular system between 1945 and 199
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presidential countries. Only Lebano
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legislative bodies are distinguishe
Page 217 and 218: legislative relations should also t
Page 219 and 220: etween independent and dependent va
Page 221 and 222: least 90 cases. Notwithstanding, as
Page 223 and 224: Table 8.1. Patterns of diffusion an
Page 225 and 226: other systems returns little to exp
Page 227 and 228: extent but the coefficient is small
Page 229 and 230: territorial organization and chambe
Page 231 and 232: there are only two (Gabon and Vanua
Page 233 and 234: the rational perspective, since it
Page 235 and 236: 9. CONCLUSIONThis study is a contri
Page 237 and 238: shows that countries having adopted
Page 239 and 240: doubt that electoral systems affect
Page 241 and 242: The third variable within the cultu
Page 243 and 244: 9.4 Final RemarksThe impact of the
Page 245 and 246: APPENDIX IClassification of countri
Page 247 and 248: Sri Lanka - SMP 1948The Constitutio
Page 249 and 250: Laos - SMP-BV 1953Laos achieved ful
Page 251 and 252: Greece - List PR 1958After having a
Page 253 and 254: Madagascar - Super-mixed 1960The 19
Page 255 and 256: Iran - SMP-BV 1963In 1963, Iran ado
Page 257 and 258: Polyarchy dataset between 1960 and
Page 259 and 260: Morocco - SMP 1970The 1970 Constitu
Page 261 and 262: APPENDIX IICountry (year of elector
Page 263 and 264: Country Democracy Electoral system
Page 265 and 266: Country Democracy Electoral system
Page 267: APPENDIX IIICountry (year of electo
Page 271 and 272: Country Colonial Regional Form of T
Page 273 and 274: APPENDIX IVParty system fragmentati
Page 275 and 276: Proportional systems - change from
Page 277 and 278: REFERENCESAhmed, Nizam. 2001. “Ba
Page 279 and 280: Blais, André and R. K. Carty. 1987
Page 281 and 282: Duverger, Maurice. 1984. “Which I
Page 283 and 284: Hartmann, Christof. 1999b. “Cote
Page 285 and 286: Koch, Christian. 2001. “Kuwait”
Page 287 and 288: Lijphart, Arend. 2002. “The Wave
Page 289 and 290: Norris, Pippa. 1995. “Introductio
Page 291 and 292: Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-
Page 293 and 294: Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shug
Page 295: Why have countries in different par
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