Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ãbo Akademi

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Country Colonial Regional Form <strong>of</strong> Territorial Chamberlegacy diffusion government organization structureTunisia (1959) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralTunisia (1997) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralTurkey (1946) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralTurkey (1961) no no parliamentary unitary bicameralTurkmenistan (1994) Soviet Union no non-democratic unitary unicameralTuvalu (1978) UK no parliamentary unitary unicameralUganda (1980) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralUkraine (1993) Soviet Union no non-democratic unitary unicameralUkraine (1997) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralUzbekistan (1992) Soviet Union no non-democratic unitary unicameralVanuatu (1980) no no parliamentary unitary unicameralVenezuela (1946) no yes non-democratic federal unicameralVenezuela (1993) no no presidential federal bicameralVietnam (1946) France no non-democratic unitary unicameralVietnam (1976) no no non-democratic unitary unicameralVietnam (S) (1956) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralYemen (1993) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralYemen (N) (1971) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralYemen (S) (1978) no yes non-democratic unitary unicameralYugoslavia (1992) no yes non-democratic federal bicameralYugoslavia (1993) no yes non-democratic federal bicameralZambia (1964) UK no non-democratic unitary unicameralZimbabwe (1980) no no non-democratic unitary bicameralZimbabwe (1985) no yes non-democratic unitary bicameral260
APPENDIX IVParty system fragmentationPlurality systems – change from plurality to proportional systemsCountry Election year Democracy Party system fragmentationArgentina I 1951 no 1.93Argentina II 1948 no 1.97Benin I 1960 no 1.75Benin II 1959 no 2.68Cape Verde 1991 no 1.81Cyprus 1976 yes 1.71El Salvador 1960 no 1.28Morocco I 1997 no 10.71Morocco II 1993 no 9.53South Africa I 1989 no 2.69South Africa II 1987 no 2.25Sri Lanka I 1977 yes 2.83Sri Lanka II 1970 yes 3.43Turkey I 1957 yes 2.47Turkey II 1954 yes 2.18Plurality systems – change from plurality to mixed systemsCountry Election year Democracy Party system fragmentationGreece 1952 yes 2.71Japan I 1993 yes 5.01Japan II 1990 yes 3.34Lesotho I 1998 no 2.28Lesotho II 1993 no 1.64Mexico I 1961 no 1.22Mexico II 1958 no 1.27New Zealand I 1993 yes 3.53New Zealand II 1990 yes 2.78Philippines I 1994 yes 4.82Philippines II 1990 yes 4.98South Korea I 1960 no 5.61South Korea II 1958 no 3.42South Korea III 1978 no 4.68South Korea IV 1973 no 3.76Thailand I 1996 yes 4.61Thailand II 1995 yes 6.81Tunisia 1989 no 1.54261
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Krister LundellContextual Determina
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CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORA
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CIP Cataloguing in PublicationLunde
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at Åbo Akademi University, the Fac
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3.2 Explanations of Electoral Syste
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9. CONCLUSION 2239.1 The Rational P
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politics. Both approaches bear rele
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electoral system choice as an epoch
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1.2 The Importance of Electoral Sys
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Within the range of democratic inst
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will depend on the specific cleavag
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Before describing different voting
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2.1.1 Ballot StructureThe ballot st
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formula, and the variety of elector
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ather be regarded as a characterist
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2.2.1 Plurality Systems2.2.1.1 Sing
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mixture of BV and PBV. In my classi
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Weaver 1984: 198-199). CV implies t
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total election, often pull out of t
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disadvantage is that it presupposes
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parties and minority groups. Furthe
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simultaneously avoiding disproporti
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and Blais. They also agree that the
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Whether one formula applies or not
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difficult. Even an independent comb
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attention to all three main dimensi
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(national, regional and local lists
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The degree of proportionality also
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variables: ethnic and cultural dive
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smallest category, representing 15
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democracies. 12 Nevertheless, the g
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(Vanuatu) are represented by merely
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKIn this cha
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ecognition of opposing views in the
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systems. If we reformulate the ques
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the rules, the lack of knowledge is
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not. Consequently, their analysis c
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proportional electoral systems. He
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groups as possible, to avoid attemp
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associated with certain features an
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also called electoral engineering.
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(2002: 14). Public opinion, often e
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Similar reform societies were estab
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systematically favor or disfavor ce
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interests based on ascriptive commu
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argues, both majorities and minorit
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A more popular form of recognizing
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Among the three basic majoritarian
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politics. When universal suffrage w
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and no electoral threshold in order
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threatened to change the current el
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inadequate since electoral systems
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electoral reform is likely to occur
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main advocates of proportional repr
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whereas majoritarian systems prevai
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The rational learning model sees po
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3.2.4.1 Colonial LegacyColonial leg
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Different colonial powers administe
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The Australian and American colonia
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epresented the “wave of the democ
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The second wave of democratization
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parliamentary elections, particular
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parliamentary or presidential gover
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measure of ethnic and cultural dive
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medium size. The other 40 per cent
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size and electoral systems, two str
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that have previously held general e
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The association between party syste
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democratization process. Neverthele
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The occurrence of list PR in former
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Third, an electoral system must exi
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Three matters are of interest in co
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according to Lijphart’s definitio
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3.3.3.2 Territorial OrganizationA n
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to the whole territory. Countries a
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or non-existence of an ‘additiona
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subset of the world’s countries,
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Concerning data on party system fra
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22). 30 Nevertheless, the coded yea
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(1) free and fair elections of the
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(e.g. 1984; 1990). The index is bas
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standards and Mauritius was democra
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Table 5.1. Ethnic and cultural frag
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Table 5.4. Ethnic and cultural frag
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values. Each integer of the logarit
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is also quite large, and therefore
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1966, and Cyprus 1981. Suriname ado
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significant. 36 The large standard
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small standard deviation values ind
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samples with changes to mixed syste
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a consequence of the party system t
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eplace plurality systems with mixed
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former British colonies did not inh
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Table 6.2. Colonial legacy and elec
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impact on the dependent variable wh
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(1993). All these countries adopted
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On the basis of figure 2.1 in secti
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their electoral systems. Bulgaria a
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as a general determinant of institu
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The average population size among c
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Only two federal states chose elect
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any major role. Regional diffusion,
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Plurality systems dominate the thir
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inherit the plurality system but al
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popular system between 1945 and 199
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presidential countries. Only Lebano
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legislative bodies are distinguishe
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legislative relations should also t
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etween independent and dependent va
Page 221 and 222: least 90 cases. Notwithstanding, as
Page 223 and 224: Table 8.1. Patterns of diffusion an
Page 225 and 226: other systems returns little to exp
Page 227 and 228: extent but the coefficient is small
Page 229 and 230: territorial organization and chambe
Page 231 and 232: there are only two (Gabon and Vanua
Page 233 and 234: the rational perspective, since it
Page 235 and 236: 9. CONCLUSIONThis study is a contri
Page 237 and 238: shows that countries having adopted
Page 239 and 240: doubt that electoral systems affect
Page 241 and 242: The third variable within the cultu
Page 243 and 244: 9.4 Final RemarksThe impact of the
Page 245 and 246: APPENDIX IClassification of countri
Page 247 and 248: Sri Lanka - SMP 1948The Constitutio
Page 249 and 250: Laos - SMP-BV 1953Laos achieved ful
Page 251 and 252: Greece - List PR 1958After having a
Page 253 and 254: Madagascar - Super-mixed 1960The 19
Page 255 and 256: Iran - SMP-BV 1963In 1963, Iran ado
Page 257 and 258: Polyarchy dataset between 1960 and
Page 259 and 260: Morocco - SMP 1970The 1970 Constitu
Page 261 and 262: APPENDIX IICountry (year of elector
Page 263 and 264: Country Democracy Electoral system
Page 265 and 266: Country Democracy Electoral system
Page 267 and 268: APPENDIX IIICountry (year of electo
Page 269 and 270: Country Colonial Regional Form of T
Page 271: Country Colonial Regional Form of T
Page 275 and 276: Proportional systems - change from
Page 277 and 278: REFERENCESAhmed, Nizam. 2001. “Ba
Page 279 and 280: Blais, André and R. K. Carty. 1987
Page 281 and 282: Duverger, Maurice. 1984. “Which I
Page 283 and 284: Hartmann, Christof. 1999b. “Cote
Page 285 and 286: Koch, Christian. 2001. “Kuwait”
Page 287 and 288: Lijphart, Arend. 2002. “The Wave
Page 289 and 290: Norris, Pippa. 1995. “Introductio
Page 291 and 292: Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-
Page 293 and 294: Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shug
Page 295: Why have countries in different par
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