Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ã bo Akademi

systems. If we reformulate the question above and ask which system is likely to bechosen, we recognize that electoral systems are chosen in the context of existinginstitutional arrangements. The institutional framework shapes the preferences ofpolitical actors as to which electoral system is to be chosen, and constrains theirnegotiating strategies over alternative rule configurations (Mozaffar 1998: 95-96).The range of alternatives has also been restricted by the (lack of) knowledge of theconstitutional drafters. Too often, Reilly and Reynolds argue, they choose the bestknownelectoral system rather than thoroughly investigate the most appropriateoptions (1999: 57). The range of alternatives is to a great extent restricted bycultural, geographical and colonial factors. Electoral system choices are, accordingto the academic literature, often a result of imitation, either in terms of coloniallegacy or regional influence. Some electoral systems have, thus, never beenrealistic options. These matters are thoroughly dealt with in section 3.2.4.3.1.3 Reforming the Electoral SystemIn the introduction, I wrote that the electoral system is easier to change than otherpolitical institutions. However, Taagepera and Shugart (1989b: 2) point out that theease of such a reform must not be overestimated. According to the academicliterature, electoral system change has been quite rare in the democratic world.Two decades ago, Nohlen (1984: 218) maintained that electoral reform occurs inextraordinary historical situations only. In the same volume, Lijphart and BernardGrofman (1984b: 11-12) addresses the following question: how likely is electoralreform? In a short survey, they conclude that there have certainly been severalmajor changes in electoral systems since the beginning of the 1970s, e.g. inNorthern Ireland, Japan and the United States, but these changes do not includeany cases of national lower-house elections. As a consequence, their answer to thequestion is: “Changes and choices in electoral systems may not be highly probable,but they are certainly possible” (1984b: 12).In Lijphart’s (1994b) study of 27 established democracies between 1945 and 1990,only France had conducted fundamental electoral changes. In an even morecomprehensive analysis by Stefano Bartolini and Mair (1990: 154-155), only 14unbroken transitions in Europe from 1885 to 1985 – meaning a major shift inelectoral rules between two democratic elections, excluding disruptions caused by59