Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice - Ã bo Akademi

Among the three basic majoritarian formulas, AV is, in Lijphart’s opinion,preferable to plurality and majority run-off elections, because, first, it selects amajority instead of a mere plurality winner, second, it chooses the majority winnermore accurately, and, third, only one round of voting is conducted (Lijphart 2002:48). Nevertheless, list PR remains the most appropriate system for dividedsocieties. By now, he has been truly defending the consociational model for morethan three decades. His dedication to proportional representation systems restslargely upon the view that they, first, have several features that are superior toother systems and, second, do not perform considerably worse on other criteria thatare particularly well provided for by other systems. He argues that PR systems“almost invariably post the best records, particularly with respect torepresentation, protection of minority interests, voter participation, and control ofunemployment” (1991a: 81).Concerning the classic debate of PR versus plurality, Reynolds writes that theprevailing academic wind clearly blows in favor of the former and against the latter(1999a: 93). There are, however, a few authors that emphasize the virtues of SMPeven in divided societies. Lardeyret (1991), for instance, asserts that the best wayto counteract the tendency for organizing competitive politics along ethnic lines isto oblige members of each group to compete against one another in single-memberdistricts. Proportional representation, he maintains, only reproduces ethniccleavages in the legislature (1991: 35). Joel Barkan (1988) is another advocate ofSMP particularly in agrarian societies, irrespective of the ethnic composition. Heargues that voters in agrarian societies tend to vote in geographical, highlyhomogeneous blocs. They focus on the basic needs of their local community, andevaluate parties and candidates in terms of their potential for constituency service.By way of conclusion, it may be stated that there is no consensus among experts onwhich electoral system is the most preferable in ethnically heterogeneouscountries. Proportional systems and AV are, nevertheless, regarded as morepreferable than other systems. Similarly, TBM and BV are often considered themost inappropriate systems to divided societies. Most authors also agree that SMPis more suitable for ethnically homogeneous than for heterogeneous countries.85