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roadmaps to reforming the un drug conventions - Beckley Foundation

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objections can be lodged and can lead <strong>to</strong> rejection of <strong>the</strong> reservation. In contrast, areservation <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1988 treaty could not be rejected because of objections by Parties.A co<strong>un</strong>try, acting ei<strong>the</strong>r alone or in parallel with o<strong>the</strong>r parties, could thus implement aversion of <strong>the</strong> suggestions in <strong>the</strong> next chapter in conformity with international law bydeno<strong>un</strong>cing <strong>the</strong> treaties and reacceding with reservations along <strong>the</strong> lines we havesuggested. Reservations filed on reaccession <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1988 treaty would have <strong>to</strong> beaccepted, despite any objections which might be filed. 57 Reservations <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1961 (asamended) and 1971 treaties could be rejected by objections from a blocking one-third ofParties.Helfer notes that objections <strong>to</strong> reservations are actually relatively rare in internationallaw. 58 But given <strong>the</strong> active opposition with which <strong>the</strong> U.S. and o<strong>the</strong>r Parties haveresponded <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bolivian attempt <strong>to</strong> amend <strong>the</strong> 1961 Convention (see section 2.1 above),a co<strong>un</strong>try taking this path would have <strong>to</strong> be prepared for <strong>the</strong> possible rejection of itsreservations <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1961 and 1971 treaties.What happens if <strong>the</strong> number of objections were <strong>to</strong> be sufficient <strong>to</strong> block a reservation isin dispute. Goodman lays out three alternative dispositions which have been argued for:(1) <strong>the</strong> reserving state may <strong>the</strong>n be bo<strong>un</strong>d except for <strong>the</strong> positions which it reservedagainst (in which case <strong>the</strong> objections would have had no practical effect); (2) <strong>the</strong> statemay just not be a party <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaty; or (3) <strong>the</strong> state may be considered a party withoutbeing able <strong>to</strong> apply <strong>the</strong> reservation. 59 Since accessions <strong>to</strong> treaties commonly take effectafter 30 days, while objections <strong>to</strong> reservations may commonly be made for up <strong>to</strong> 12months, 60 <strong>the</strong> situation might well become not only ambiguous but also quite confused.To avoid such ambiguity, Bolivia made its reaccession contingent on acceptance of itsreservation. So if <strong>the</strong> reservation is not accepted, Bolivia remains outside <strong>the</strong> 1961 treaty.Such a result would be contrary <strong>to</strong> a main goal of <strong>the</strong> international <strong>drug</strong> control system,<strong>the</strong> one goal on which it can be seen by all <strong>un</strong>ambiguously <strong>to</strong> have succeeded. Thesystem has prided itself on attaining near-<strong>un</strong>iversality in accession <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> treaties; <strong>the</strong>INCB annual reports each include a section on <strong>the</strong> current status in this regard. Thoughthose staffing and committed <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> system in its present form might be extremely57The one path which could in <strong>the</strong>ory disallow a reservation would be a lawsuit asking <strong>the</strong>International Court of Justice <strong>to</strong> rule <strong>the</strong> reservation “contrary <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> object and purpose of <strong>the</strong>Convention”. This could not be filed by any of <strong>the</strong> many parties, including <strong>the</strong> U.S. for <strong>the</strong> 1988Convention (see Table 3), which filed a reservation rejecting <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction of <strong>the</strong> ICJ over <strong>the</strong>particular treaty.58Helfer, 2006.59Goodman, R. ‘Human rights treaties, invalid reservations, and state consent’. American Journal ofInternational Law 96:531−60, 2002.60Pellet, A. Fourteenth report on reservations <strong>to</strong> treaties. International Law Commission, 61st session.New York: United Nations, General Assembly, 2009, pp. 25−28, document A/CN/4/614/Add.2http://daccess-dds-ny.<strong>un</strong>.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/450/18/PDF/N0945018.pdf?OpenElement(accessed 7 April, 2012).23

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