FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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Chapter 22-43. Several things have to happen to wage systems warfare. Acknowledging the difficulty ofsuccessfully predicting outcomes in nonlinear, complex environments and the multitude of constantlyoccurring complex interactions, the enemy will develop possibilities or hypotheses about the systems of itsopponent comprising the U.S. and its coalition coherence, will, and decision making.2-44. Systems warfare requires detailed information on targets and their possible effects. The enemy willattempt to find and attack critical links, nodes, seams, and vulnerabilities in U.S. systems that offer the bestopportunity to “level the playing field.” This entails RISTA capabilities linked directly to IED operationsthat are tailored to affect specific capabilities whose loss or degradation will significantly reduce overallforce effectiveness of U.S. or coalition forces.2-45. Therefore, the enemy often targets the “soft” components of U.S. or coalition combat systems.Attacking U.S. or coalition logistics, command and control (C2), and RISTA can undermine the overalleffectiveness of our combat system without having to directly engage our superior combat and combatsupport (CS) forces. IEDs can be the weapons of choice for doing so.Note. A combat system is the “system of systems” that results from the synergistic combinationof five basic subsystems that are interrelated to achieve a military function: combat forces, CSforces, logistics forces, C2, and RISTA.2-46. IEDs are useful for systems warfare, as a means of attacking U.S. and coalition lines ofcommunications (LOCs), convoys, and other logistics assets. They also provide a means to attack U.S. orcoalition C2, combat forces, and CS forces without having to mount force-on-force attacks. In thenonlinear, distributed battlespace of a complex OE, some of the smallest activities and interactions cancause the greatest effects. No activity is subject to successful prediction.CONTROL THE TEMPO2-47. The enemy forces will try to execute IED operations at the time and place of their own choosing.IED activities may not be linked to other enemy actions or objectives. Rather, their purpose is to inflictmass casualties or destroy flagship systems (both of which reduce U.S. or coalition forces) and continuethe fight.2-48. Enemy forces can vary the tempo of IED operations. A period of relatively low activity in IEDemployment might lull U.S. or coalition forces into a false sense of security, making them more vulnerableto the next round of IEDs.CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT2-49. Enemy forces will try to change the nature of the conflict in order to exploit the differences betweenfriendly and enemy capabilities and sensitivities and to present U.S. or coalition forces with conditions forwhich it is not prepared. Enemy organizations will adjust their IED TTP to the strengths and weaknesses ofU.S. or coalition forces. The enemy is prepared to disperse his forces in areas of sanctuary and employthem in ways that present a battlefield that is difficult for U.S. or coalition forces to analyze and predict.Enemy forces may use a sympathetic population to provide refuge or a base of operations. They move outof sanctuaries and employ IEDs when they can create a window of opportunity or when physical or naturalconditions present an opportunity. Also, they may use IEDs against U.S., coalition, or host nation (HN)civilians or Soldiers and Marines not directly connected to the intervention, as a device to change thefundamental nature of the conflict.ALLOW NO SANCTUARY2-50. Enemy forces seek to use IEDs to deny U.S. or coalition forces safe haven during every phase of adeployment and as long as they are in the region or threatening to intervene there. The resultant drain onU.S. or coalition manpower and resources to provide adequate force protection (FP) measures can reduce2-8 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005
Contemporary Operational Environmentstrategic, operational, and tactical means to conduct war. Such actions will not only deny U.S. or coalitionforces sanctuary, but also erodes their national will.2-51. IEDs can be used to cause politically unacceptable casualties anywhere and at any time. However,they can be used at a particular time and/or place in order to deny U.S. or coalition forces access to an area,deny them safe haven, disrupt logistics, or impede movement. They can also be used to assassinate keymilitary, government, or civilian figures or to target a particular group or organization. Physical casualtiescaused by IEDs also create a psychological effect that can intimidate or coerce others.2-52. IED operations are basically nonlinear. The enemy, whether a nation-state or nonstate actor, will tryto present U.S. or coalition forces with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlespace in which there is no safe “reararea.” The enemy can use IEDs to attack our headquarters (HQ), logistics centers, and supply andevacuation routes. It can also use IEDs to attack our living quarters, dining facilities, and places frequentedby our off-duty Soldiers, Marines, and civilians.VARIED ACTIONS2-53. Most of the above principles to some degree involve decentralized, dispersed, and distributedactivities. To best attack superior forces, enemy leaders use initiative to conduct IED operations at a timeand place of their choosing. This may mean acting at a time and place and under circumstances to offsetU.S. advantages and maximize sanctuary from effects of U.S. or coalition systems. The enemy also variesthe types of IEDs it employs and the methods of employment. This can make pattern analysis andtemplating challenging for U.S. or coalition forces.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 2-9
Page 2: ForewordAttacks from improvised exp
Page 7 and 8: Introduction“This is not a new wa
Page 9 and 10: Chapter 1FundamentalsWith the proli
Page 11 and 12: Fundamentals• Avoid activities. T
Page 13 and 14: Fundamentals• Explosive hazard. A
Page 15 and 16: Chapter 2Contemporary Operational E
Page 17 and 18: Contemporary Operational Environmen
Page 19 and 20: Contemporary Operational Environmen
Page 21: Contemporary Operational Environmen
Page 25 and 26: Chapter 3Improvised Explosive Devic
Page 27 and 28: Improvised Explosive Device ThreatF
Page 31 and 32: Improvised Explosive Device Charact
Page 33 and 34: Improvised Explosive Device Charact
Page 35 and 36: Chapter 5Organizations Involved in
Page 37 and 38: Organizations Involved in Improvise
Page 47: Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 51 and 52: Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 53 and 54: Improvised Explosive Device Respons
Page 57 and 58: Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Page 69 and 70: Chapter 8Training RequirementsUnits
Page 71 and 72: Training RequirementsENEMY TACTICS8
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Training RequirementsCompany Level
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Training RequirementsTable 8-2. Cri
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Appendix AMetric Conversion ChartTh
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Appendix BIntelligenceThe process o
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IntelligenceB-10. As with standard
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IntelligenceB-16. HUMINT provides t
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Intelligenceturn, broadcast video v
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IntelligenceSECTION III - PROCESS C
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Appendix COrganization Contact Info
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Organization Contact Information an
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Organization Contact Information an
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Appendix DRecording and Tracking Im
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Recording and Tracking Improvised E
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Recording and Tracking Improvised E
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Appendix ETactics, Techniques, and
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Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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Appendix FMilitary SearchMilitary s
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Military SearchPRINCIPLES• Ambush
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Military Search• Potential VBIED
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Appendix GSpecialized EquipmentIn g
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Specialized EquipmentCASSPIRG-3. Th
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Specialized EquipmentROBOTSFigure G
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Specialized EquipmentFigure G-12. A
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Specialized Equipment• Two shock
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Appendix HTraining ResourcesTASKSTh
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Training ResourcesH-9. A video avai
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GlossarySECTION I - ACRONYMS AND AB
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GlossaryDOTLDDOTMLPFDirectorate of
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GlossaryIVMMDIWJCMECJDIGSJIEDDJIMJI
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GlossaryOPORD operation orderops op
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GlossaryWITWMDwwwweapons intelligen
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ReferencesSOURCES USEDThese are the
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References*FMI 4-30.5. Modular EOD
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FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.0121 Septemb
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FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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