Appendix B• Regularly spaced objects, such as telephone poles and street lights that allow insurgents toassess convoy speed and, thus, time their IED detonations more accurately. Convoycommanders need to be aware of these areas.• Areas in which the population is known or inclined to be hostile to friendly forces. The areas arehigher IED attack threats since they are less likely to reveal IED attackers operating in theirmidst.B-6. It is also important to develop, as quickly as possible, a detailed knowledge of what is normal alongthe routes in the unit AO. Understanding what the terrain along the routes normally looks like will facilitatechange detection via patrols and IMINT collection that can identify possible IED emplacements. Knowingwhat is normal in terms of human activity patterns along the route provides an indicator of impendingattack when changes are noticed by patrols, HUMINT assets, or other collection methods.DETERMINE THREAT MODELSB-7. While insurgents or terrorists do not have doctrine that can be templated in the sense that we think ofwhen dealing with regular armies, they do have methods and TTP that can be understood. These changefrequently based on success or failure and changes in friendly procedures. The best way to understandthese are to communicate with units already operating in the prospective AOs, or at least keep up withreports coming out of those areas. This is also a case when intelligence reach is important. Nationalagencies, such as the DIA, NGIC, and Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) will often follow threatactivities in likely hot spots even before decisions are made to deploy U.S. forces there. Things to focus onwith regard to IEDs include―• Favored initiation methods.• The most common indicators of an emplaced IED (wires protruding from dead animals, freshholes next to roads, junked cars).• The kinds of materials used in the IEDs (these can vary even in different parts of the sametheater) and their likely sources.• Favored targets (Do the insurgents prefer to target military forces or terrorize the civilianpopulation? Do certain kinds or configurations of convoys seem to invite more attacks? Certainvehicle types invite more IED attacks.).• How many different types of IEDs are common, and is there some pattern to their use. (Thiscould suggest how many different IED makers are active and roughly where they operate.)B-8. If enemy methods are sufficiently well known, create tactical-level templates for use in developingfriendly counter-IED TTP for convoys, patrols, and so forth. If not, then make the best representativetemplates possible based on experiences in other AOs and/or previous conflicts (the more recent thebetter). This is not as bad a solution as it may sound; insurgents and terrorists communicate successful TTPworldwide via the Internet, and often what works in one part of the world will appear quickly in others.DETERMINE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTIONB-9. IEDs are a tactic of insurgents, so most likely the S-2 or G-2 will incorporate IEDs within largerenemy COAs developed in preparation for wargaming. The nature and use of IEDs that the S-2 will predictdepends on the knowledge of the goals, objectives, and technical capabilities of the insurgent force, areaswith sympathetic populations and, above all, on past experiences and patterns. For example, an insurgencythat is primarily foreign-based or based on a specific ethnic or religious group may be willing to launchattacks that target local populations, while one that is nationalistic or operating among its own peoplemight not. Insurgencies aiming to overthrow a government may focus more on governmental, military, andpolice structures, while those seeking redress of more specific grievances may focus more tightly on thoseelements closely associated with those grievances (such as upper-class economic targets). How aninsurgency uses IEDs will be part of this larger framework of goals and intent. In terms of IEDsspecifically, technical capabilities (current and predicted) are important, while the most importantconsiderations of all are recent methods and trends.B-2 <strong>FMI</strong> 3-<strong>34.119</strong>/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005
IntelligenceB-10. As with standard IPB, the G-2 or S-2 will develop an event template (Figure B-1) with NAIs andlikely enemy actions noted, to include likely IED attack sites based on the complete IPB process up to thispoint.Figure B-1. Event template21 September 2005 <strong>FMI</strong> 3-<strong>34.119</strong>/MCIP 3-17.01 B-3
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