FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

IntelligenceSECTION III – PROCESS CONSIDERATIONSB-32. Use of intelligence surveillance (INTS) of various intelligence disciplines (HUMINT, IMINT,SIGINT, and so forth), will be the most important in a counterinsurgency operation. It will provide themost knowledge of enemy personalities, organizations locations, and intentions.Note. There may be more than one insurgent group operating in your AO, possibly with little orno connection to each other.B-33. If you have control of HUMINT assets, you will need to organize a control structure, including anoperational management team (OMT) at BCT level or a human intelligence operations center (HOC) atdivision level; an S-2 or G-2 to coordinate with higher, adjacent, interagency, and HN intelligencecapabilities; and resource funding, equipment, and rewards to support source operations. ST 2-22.7provides detailed guidance on the use and conduct of HUMINT.B-34. In addition to planning how to use the intelligence means at your disposal, organize the analyticalassets to take advantage of HUMINT in particular. Functions, such as document exploitation, open sourcemedia monitoring, and technical exploitation of items (such as computers, wireless, and cellulartelephones) and will be important to the analytical effort. Analysts need to understand such things as linkanalysis and tools (for example, the analyst notebook); how insurgent forces are organized and operate; thecritical needs of an insurgency, to include funding, arms suppliers, safe houses or areas, training areas, andintelligence collection; and insurgent use of IO. Commanders and analysts should be prepared to build andupdate a situation template based on HUMINT and supplement it by other disciplines.B-35. Intelligence support to targeting will be much different than what was learned in the schoolhouse.Instead of using the detecting, tracking, and engaging systems, you will be using D3A with the outcome ofidentifying, locating, and detaining persons and controlling key areas. The main targeting problems will beunderstanding the insurgent organizations being fought, especially identifying the key people, and thenmaking sure that there is enough accurate information to make attempting to capture the personsworthwhile. It demands a great deal more patience and persistence than targeting in a major combatoperation. Use the targeting functions of D3A.B-36. The ability to establish or link into other intelligence sources is called intelligence reach or accessingof the resources of national, joint, foreign, and other military organizations and these units will beimportant to you no matter what your echelon. Reporting, databases, feeds from higher HQ and staffs,adjacent, JIM collection systems help complete your picture, and in some cases will determine whether ornot your unit executes an operation. Coordinate with your higher intelligence staff and your command,control, communications and computer operations (C4 Ops) officer (S-6) or Assistant Chief of Staff,Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations (C4 Ops) (G-6) should be coordinatedwith to determine what can be accessed and how to get it done.B-37. Linguists, in particular contract linguists, will be a major concern. They are critical to your ability toconduct HUMINT and CI, perform SIGINT collection, develop psychological operation products, andperform CA and liaison with local national forces and government and NGO elements. Military linguists(primarily 97E in HUMINT and 98G in SIGINT) are proficient enough to perform their duties in a majorcombat operation; however, being effective in stability and reconstruction operations andcounterinsurgency operating environments requires native-level fluency, preferably in the specific dialectcommon in the AO. Hiring contract linguists with security clearances is generally done through acentralized DOD-level contractor; acquiring, distributing, and managing these linguists is an S-2/G-2responsibility. The following considerations should be kept in mind:• Since these linguists are civilians, the theater commander may not allow them to be armed.There will be specific rules governing what they can or cannot do, a combination of the rulesgoverning contractors on the battlefield and specific restrictions applied by the contractorproviding the linguists.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 B-9