FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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Chapter 8have confidence in the ability of his unit to meet expectations on arrival in-theater. The training strategyoutlined in Tables 8-1 and 8-2, pages 8-4 through 8-7, show key skills, activities, and tasks that the leaderand commander must see subordinates perform to standard. Demonstration of those skills requiresprioritizing requirements for subordinates, allocating and providing the right resources, and the timing ofthe specific training exercises to cause subordinates to execute their responsibilities under relevantconditions.8-5. Leaders need to apply tactical lessons learned to predeployment training and resource this trainingwith personnel and equipment not organic to current modified tables of organization and equipment(MTOEs).TRAINING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FIELD8-6. Paragraphs 8-7 through 8-11 refer to Table 8-1.TACTICAL EXPECTATIONS8-7. The column “Tactical Expectations” describes the tactical capabilities that theater missions,conditions, and threats demand of all units regardless of the type, function, or prewar doctrine. This doesnot replace unit functional requirements. For some combat arms, Soldiers, Marines, and unit expectationsdiffer little from prewar doctrinal requirements. For many units, particularly CS, CSS, and units assignednonstandard missions, these expectations are different from prewar doctrinal assumptions and trainingconditions. At the collective levels, expectations include shifting of tactical responsibilities, which underprewar doctrine belonged to the corps or division levels, down to lower levels of command for planningand execution.TACTICAL TECHNIQUES REQUIRED8-8. The column “Tactical Techniques” describes the skills that subordinates must train on in order toeffectively meet the tactical expectations. For example, the conditions in-theater will require all Soldiersand Marines to participate in patrols. It does not matter whether this is an infantry Soldier or Marineparticipating in a reconnaissance patrol, an artilleryman participating in a combat patrol, or a CSS Soldieror Marine participating in a base security patrol. To meet the tactical expectation for Soldiers and Marinesto be able to patrol, they must have been trained in these skills before deployment.CAPABILITIES REQUIRED8-9. The column “Required Capabilities” describes the required minimum personnel or materielcapabilities necessary for effective training, to include predeployment training. In many cases, thesespecialized personnel or additional equipment are part of a prewar MTOE of the unit or doctrinalexpectations. Based on prewar doctrinal assumptions for many CS, CSS, and ARNG units, these items areeither low-density items, not yet fielded, or not available for predeployment training. However, executionof operations, techniques, and threats may require these additional capabilities.TRAINING CONDITIONS8-10. The column “Training Conditions” requires leaders to assess readiness to meet tactical expectations.Realistic training conditions are essential to closing the gap between predeployment training and theaterexpectations. Conditions and standards that are published in doctrinal manuals and mission training plans(MTPs) may not be relevant to the expectations in-theater. For example, units experienced and conditionedby peacekeeping operations must be trained and conditioned for counterinsurgency operations because theyare not the same. For most organizations, developing relevant, realistic training conditions requiresreviewing and revising training resource allocations, peacetime range operations, and traditional branch orunit training strategies.8-2 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005
Training RequirementsENEMY TACTICS8-11. The column “Enemy Tactics” describes the enemy tactics that Soldiers, Marines, and units mustunderstand. Soldiers, Marines, and units require practice and experience applying the required tacticaltechniques and capabilities, under realistic conditions, for the focused purpose of defeating these enemytactics and techniques. In training, opposing force (OPFOR) tactics are the most important aspect toemphasize. Specific techniques (types of IEDs, types of attacks) change very rapidly; however, enemytactics (regardless of technique) typically remain relatively stable. Commanders must resist the temptationto chase the latest enemy technique during predeployment training and instead use enemy tactics todevelop experience, adaptation, and aggressiveness in subordinates.STAFF TRAINING8-12. Commanders should ensure that staffs are properly trained to conduct planning as discussed inChapter 7. Planning becomes an important process during IED defeat operations.UNIT TRAINING8-13. Unit training is a continuous process. Success comes from battle-focused training that emphasizesthe training of essential warfighting tasks to standard. Units, leaders, and individuals train to standard ontheir assigned missions, first as an organic unit and then as an integrated component of a team. Theirbattle-focused training experience gives them the flexibility to continue training and adapting to themission as it evolves.8-14. The commander’s responsibility is to focus on developing individual and collective training, not onlymission-essential tasks. Visualizing the decisive effects is more important than simply listing all the MTPtasks and standards. The commander should―• Establish the relationship between doctrinal concepts, unit mission-related priorities, andphysical demonstration of proficiency.• Describe the intent―visualization of desired arrangement of battlefield activities and thecompetencies required to achieve it.• Establish personal measures for assessing organizational capability to meet requirements.• Provide multiechelon training exercises that develop and assess appropriate leader, staff, andunit training.• Arrange live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) training to sustain proficiency and to expand anexperience base for commanders, leaders, staffs, and units.• Design and resource exercise evaluations (EXEVALs) and situational training exercises (STXs)to create opportunities to develop, observe, and assess combat proficiency.8-15. Senior commanders use training evaluations as one component of a feedback system. To keep thetraining system dynamic, they use feedback to determine the effectiveness of the planning, execution, andassessment portions of the training management cycle. These feedback systems allow the seniorcommander to make changes that lead to superior training results and to teach, coach, and mentorsubordinate leaders. To be effective, this feedback flows between senior and subordinate HQ, within eachcommand echelon, and among a network of trainers that may cross several command lines. See Table 8-2,page 8-6, for a summary of suggested critical tasks for collective training.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 8-3
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ForewordAttacks from improvised exp
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Introduction“This is not a new wa
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Chapter 1FundamentalsWith the proli
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Fundamentals• Avoid activities. T
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Fundamentals• Explosive hazard. A
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Chapter 2Contemporary Operational E
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Contemporary Operational Environmen
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Page 57 and 58: Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
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Page 75 and 76: Training RequirementsTable 8-2. Cri
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Page 79 and 80: Appendix BIntelligenceThe process o
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Page 87 and 88: IntelligenceSECTION III - PROCESS C
Page 89 and 90: Appendix COrganization Contact Info
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Page 95 and 96: Appendix DRecording and Tracking Im
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Page 101 and 102: Appendix ETactics, Techniques, and
Page 103 and 104: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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Page 107 and 108: Appendix FMilitary SearchMilitary s
Page 109 and 110: Military SearchPRINCIPLES• Ambush
Page 111 and 112: Military Search• Potential VBIED
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Page 115 and 116: Specialized EquipmentCASSPIRG-3. Th
Page 117 and 118: Specialized EquipmentROBOTSFigure G
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Specialized Equipment• Two shock
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Appendix HTraining ResourcesTASKSTh
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Training ResourcesH-9. A video avai
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GlossarySECTION I - ACRONYMS AND AB
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GlossaryDOTLDDOTMLPFDirectorate of
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GlossaryIVMMDIWJCMECJDIGSJIEDDJIMJI
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GlossaryOPORD operation orderops op
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GlossaryWITWMDwwwweapons intelligen
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ReferencesSOURCES USEDThese are the
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References*FMI 4-30.5. Modular EOD
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FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.0121 Septemb
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FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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