FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Planning Considerations• Filter out “white noise” IEDs from mass casualty IEDs. (White noise IEDs are quicklyemployed and hard to stop, but create less damage; mass casualty IEDs take longer to emplaceand create more damage.) Display different IED types geospatially, with color-codedrepresentation, to better convey knowledge to decision makers.• Use microterrain where possible for line-of-sight analysis, to include fire points, observationpoints and distances, range fans for potential enemy IED employment, and rapid response byfriendly forces.• Identify ideal prestaging locations for engineer and EOD equipment and/or teams to achieve arapid response.• Identify ingress and egress routes to potential IED event sites for threat interdiction and friendlyresponse COA analysis.• Fuse IED information with other data, to include cultural inferences (such as friendly or hostilemosque and/or ethnic group), civil affairs (CA) data (sewer, utilities, transportation), and soforth.• Map out HUMINT, such as a hostile leader who was detained at one location and resides at adifferent location. Build patterns that can be used to geospatially understand the flow of threatpersonnel, information, and weapons.• Understand how the enemy thinks. Use geospatial tools to understand the potential threat TTP.(Which route is frequently used by coalition forces? What locations will provide good visibilityof the route and give the triggerman enough standoff space to egress after the attack? What areasoffer the best concealment for the IED? Is there a feature that could serve as an aiming point forIED detonation? Are there locations where the terrain would enhance the IED blast effects?Where can the IED be emplaced to destroy coalition forces but not injure civilians who areallied with the insurgency?)7-12. IPB products include the modified combined-obstacle overlay (MCOO), enemy SITTEMPs, eventtemplates, and the high-value target list (HVTL) and provide key information in building the COP.Appendix B provides specific IED defeat considerations during the IPB.TARGETING7-13. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate responseto them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities (JP 1-02). It is an integral part ofArmy operations. Based on the commander’s targeting guidance and targeting objectives, the targetingteam determines what targets to attack and how, where, and when to attack. It then assigns targets tosystems best suited to achieve the desired effects. Targeting begins during planning and continuesthroughout the operations process. It is a mechanism for the commander and staff to use to continuallyupdate and refine the plan and assess the operations through a cyclical process.7-14. The targeting process follows the functions of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) (seeFM 6-20-10). The targeting team, represented by the entire staff, considers all options (lethal andnonlethal) to create the desired effect on the intended targets.7-15. The targeting process is another means of integrating IED defeat into unit operations. Critical nodeswithin the IED attack system of the enemy can be identified and nominated as high-payoff targets.Examples include specific leaders, bomb makers, or munitions caches. Collection assets are then assigned,ranging from HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) toreconnaissance patrols. Options are developed to attack key enemy IED nodes or to counter enemy IEDattack efforts.7-16. SMEs from various in-theater organizations, such as CEXC, provide targeting data which aids theprioritization and selection of targets.21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 7-3