FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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Chapter 7• Improving formal and informal connections. Formal and informal connections with the localpopulation should be improved in a controlled manner, from the highest commander to thelowest level and tracking and assimilation of this information into the planning process shouldbe ensured. This can include use of Special Forces, NGO, contractors, and interpreters;information obtained by employment; proper treatment of the local population on projects fortheir benefit and the benefit of the unit; establishment of business opportunities for local leadersand their community; and media considerations. For example, there may be an opportunity tocreate conditions for brass and plastic recycling during ammunition de-milling or to establish alocal construction element for road improvement in the area that benefits local and militaryactivities. Such activities are essential to decrease the IED production at the source, providingthat the community needs are met and the information is shared with the local population in sucha way as to convey good intent by the units.Note. The perceived ability to attack and destroy IED enemy nodes contributes to success instability and reconstruction operations by deterring potential threats. Conversely, successfulstability and reconstruction operations reduce the chance of IED threat by influencing civiliansto not support the enemy efforts.SUMMARY7-49. IED defeat considerations are incorporated into unit plans through the MDMP or TLP. AdditionalIPB, targeting, and risk management are other tools to assist commanders and staffs with IED defeatthroughout the operations process. The IED planning considerations offered in this chapter serve as a guidefor further development based on the situation.7-14 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2005
Chapter 8Training RequirementsUnits must be prepared to perform IED defeat to serve in-theaters of operationsaround the world. Upon arrival to a theater, units are finding themselves performingoperations traditionally reserved for combat arms units. With a clear lack of visiblelines of contact, Soldiers and Marines are finding themselves constantly on guard andpotentially performing combat arms tasks. Training at home stations beforedeployment is critical to ensure that units traditionally designated as CS and combatservice support (CSS) can maneuver and survive on the battlefield. The informationin this chapter will provide some necessary skills and information to be consideredbefore deployment to a theater of operation.OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD8-1. There is a significant tactical performance gap between unit predeployment training tasks,conditions, standards, and the actual tactical environment and mission expectations in-theater. Theater,FORSCOM, and TRADOC predeployment training guidance list tasks, but do not describe requiredcapabilities. Units practice individual TTP, rather than execute a battle-focused wartime training strategy.Mandated certification of standardized tasks is driving a sequential, event-driven approach topredeployment training strategy, vice the battle-focused training strategies described in Army trainingdoctrine.8-2. Soldiers, Marines, and units transitioning for reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration(RSOI) report an expectation that they will be “trained” by someone before commitment to operations.This is particularly true for CS and CSS units. Some units with a high level of enemy attacks were found tohave limited relevant training and low confidence in their own ability to fight effectively. They tend to lookfor a “silver bullet,” such as SOPs, a text book TTP, or training from others outside their own leadership.Some units are assigned missions that are either different from their prewar mission (such as MultipleLaunch Rocket System [MLRS] battalions performing military police battalion missions) or are executingmissions under different conditions than prewar doctrinal assumptions (for example, there is no secure reararea).8-3. The theater expects individuals and units that are trained to be ready to fight on arrival. There isneither time nor the resources to make up for predeployment training shortfalls during RSOI. The conceptsof multiechelon training and the commander’s responsibilities are essential to effective predeploymenttraining. However, current operations have also shown that the conditions do not always match ourestablished prewar doctrinal assumptions, training procedures, and exercises. For some combat arms unitsthe difference is not great, requiring little adjustments. For many units, however, experiences in currentoperations have shown that prewar training techniques, resources, and assumptions have not preparedSoldiers, Marines, staffs, or leaders for the demands of combat. Training for current operations oftenmeans discarding or re-evaluating “the way we have always done it.”8-4. Basic expectations can be ascribed to any Army unit deployed to current operational theaters(combat, CS, CSS). Assessment of expectations and conditions in the current operational theaters havebeen synthesized down to this simple summary of tactical expectations, required techniques, requiredcapabilities, training conditions, and enemy tactics. While it is infeasible to put every unit in the field at thehighest collective levels or to recreate a combat training center (CTC)-like environment at everyinstallation, it is not infeasible to train effectively and realistically. An effective predeployment trainingstrategy to develop the right capabilities at the right levels is key. A commander (at any echelon) needs to21 September 2005 FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 8-1
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ForewordAttacks from improvised exp
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Introduction“This is not a new wa
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Chapter 1FundamentalsWith the proli
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Fundamentals• Avoid activities. T
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Fundamentals• Explosive hazard. A
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Chapter 2Contemporary Operational E
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Page 27 and 28: Improvised Explosive Device ThreatF
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Page 71 and 72: Training RequirementsENEMY TACTICS8
Page 73 and 74: Training RequirementsCompany Level
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Page 87 and 88: IntelligenceSECTION III - PROCESS C
Page 89 and 90: Appendix COrganization Contact Info
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Page 95 and 96: Appendix DRecording and Tracking Im
Page 97 and 98: Recording and Tracking Improvised E
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Page 101 and 102: Appendix ETactics, Techniques, and
Page 103 and 104: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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Page 107 and 108: Appendix FMilitary SearchMilitary s
Page 109 and 110: Military SearchPRINCIPLES• Ambush
Page 111 and 112: Military Search• Potential VBIED
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Page 117 and 118: Specialized EquipmentROBOTSFigure G
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Specialized EquipmentFigure G-12. A
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Specialized Equipment• Two shock
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Appendix HTraining ResourcesTASKSTh
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Training ResourcesH-9. A video avai
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GlossarySECTION I - ACRONYMS AND AB
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GlossaryDOTLDDOTMLPFDirectorate of
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GlossaryIVMMDIWJCMECJDIGSJIEDDJIMJI
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GlossaryOPORD operation orderops op
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GlossaryWITWMDwwwweapons intelligen
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ReferencesSOURCES USEDThese are the
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References*FMI 4-30.5. Modular EOD
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FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.0121 Septemb
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FMI 3-34.119 - Soldier Support Institute - U.S. Army

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