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Economic Report of the President 1994 - The American Presidency ...

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TABLE 6-6.—Intrafirm Trade as Share <strong>of</strong> Total U.S. Exports to andImports from Europe and Japan, 1992[Percent <strong>of</strong> total]U.S. importsRegion to fromregionEurope 32.4 46.3Japan 36.2 75.0World total 30.6 45.0Note.—Intrafirm trade is defined as merchandise trade between "related parties" (that is, between affiliates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> samefirm).Source: Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Census.<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. Domestic industrial support policies in Japan haveincluded subsidies to producers and to research and developmentconsortia, preferential tax treatment, preferential access to credit,government procurement preferences, establishment <strong>of</strong> producercartels, and lax antitrust enforcement. External policies have includedtrade protection, restrictions on inward foreign direct investment,and control over high-technology trade. <strong>The</strong>se policies havebeen applied to both infant and senescent industries.With a few notable exceptions, including agriculture, Japanesetariffs and import quotas are not significant trade barriers. Yet Japan'smarket is regarded by many as effectively closed to imports<strong>of</strong> many foreign manufactures, especially those that directly competewith Japanese goods. Structural barriers alleged to deter importsinclude reliance on bureaucratic control to ensure productsafety; domestic cartels, discriminatory pr-ctices by <strong>the</strong> keiretsu,and weak enforcement <strong>of</strong> competition policies; inadequate intellectualproperty protection; government procurement procedures thatfavor domestic suppliers; imperfect capital markets that inhibit inwardforeign investment; and impediments in <strong>the</strong> distributionchannels for imported products—to name a few.Estimating <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mostly overt barriers to trade inprimary products is relatively straightforward. One recent studyconcluded that complete elimination <strong>of</strong> all agricultural trade barriersin Japan might increase <strong>the</strong> incomes <strong>of</strong> U.S. producers by 28percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> bilateral agricultural exports. This wouldoccur through a combination <strong>of</strong> higher export volumes to Japan andhigher prices on exports to all markets. Comparable figures for potentialgains in minerals and, importantly, services, are not available.What attracts <strong>the</strong> most attention, however, is <strong>the</strong> potential gainin manufactures. And here <strong>the</strong> story is far more controversial because<strong>the</strong> subtle nature <strong>of</strong> Japan's trade barriers poses difficultproblems for economists trying to assess <strong>the</strong>ir impact. In consequence,researchers have eschewed direct measurement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sebarriers and focused instead on inferring <strong>the</strong>ir impact indirectly by218

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