Violence in Nigeria

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122 forces is the same in all violent incidents where they intervene. Ethno-political and religious conflicts are very common, and the intervention of the security forces in these conflicts causes more deaths. 41 In law enforcement, the police and other security agencies have a tendency to kill rather than arrest and prosecute criminal suspects. 42 Although the police are the primary institution responsible for law enforcement and internal security, routine deployment of the army for internal security duties has resulted in cases where their encounters with criminals have caused many deaths. In terms of relationship, more people have been killed in violent incidents where the army is involved. The internal security operations of the army are usually characterized by high fatalities, resulting from excessive use of force. Figure 6.2 represents the major protagonists in incidents where the army and the police intervened and their corresponding number of deaths. The results show that most fatalities caused by the army or its adversaries are recorded in violent conflicts involving religious and political groups. Of course, the army has killed more insurgents and civilians since its engagement with the Boko Haram Islamic group in the North-East. The ideology of the Boko Haram group makes them both an Islamic and a political group; but if it is possible to differentiate between the two types of group, the army appears to cause more deaths in violent incidents involving religious groups. Besides political and religious groups, the intervention of the army in violent conflicts involving communities within the same period resulted in 1,572 fatalities. This shows that the army is more violent in its engagement with the public than the police and that its intervention in violent conflicts often results in more deaths. Compared with the army, the relationships between the police and political groups, religious associations, trade unions, and host communities appear less violent. However, the involvement of the police in conflicts involving political groups causes more fatalities. Figure 6.2 shows that between June 2006 and May 2014, fatal incidents where the police intervened resulted in 1,332 fatalities when they involved political groups, 877 fatalities when they involved communities, and 612 fatalities when they involved trade unions. Perhaps the politicization of the engagement of the security forces with civilians is responsible for this pattern of large numbers of fatalities in incidents involving political groups. 41 42 Hill, Nigeria Since Independence. Serrano, R. & P. Zacharias (2014), By the Numbers: The Nigerian State’s Efforts to Counter Boko Haram. In: M.-A. Pérouse de Montclos, ed., Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria. Leiden: African Studies Centre, p. 207.
123 Figure 6.2 Number of violent deaths resulting from incidents where the security forces intervened, by type of relationship (June 2006-May 2014) Main protagonists in incidents where the army have caused fatalities Since 1999, successive civilian governments have established various militarydominated JTFs, under whose auspices the army is routinely deployed for law enforcement and internal security operations. 43 Unfortunately, the internal security operations of the army are usually characterized by the use of disproportionate force, causing high civilian fatalities. Since 2006, the intervention of the army in violent conflicts involving the police, communities, trade unions, political groups, and religious associations has caused very many deaths. A total of 7,648 fatalities were recorded in 529 out of a total of 880 lethal incidents where the army was involved. This translates to an average of 60% of all army interventions causing fatalities. Figure 6.3 presents the distribution of these incidents over the years under study. 43 Francis, P., D. LaPin & P. Rossiasco (2011), Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC.
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Violence in Nigeria A qualitative a
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African Studies Centre (ASC) Instit
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Contents LIST OF FIGURES vii LIST O
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List of figures 1.1 FRSC and Nigeri
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List of tables 1.1 Severity index o
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NDV Niger Delta Vigilante NHRC Nati
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Foreword The challenge of managing
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Introduction: Arguments for a quali
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customed to poor numbers shaping ho
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arrested and disappeared. As for Bo
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ual killings. As for the link betwe
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in 104 deaths between 2006 and 2014
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Trends and patterns of fatal road a
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all accidents on Nigerian roads inv
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sarawa State were killed in a multi
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safety measures. Christie argued th
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fatal road accidents because it rec
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Map 1.1 Fatalities caused by road a
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Figure 1.3 Vehicle types and road a
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Monthly analysis of fatal road acci
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driving, a situation that frequentl
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Table 1.3 Yearly breakdown of road
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However, the administration of Gove
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has been a large increase in the nu
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pecially along the Lagos-Sagamu-Iba
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39 Conclusion This study has examin
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Patterns and trend analysis of viol
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of Nigeria on the country’s dilap
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a need to bring indigenous investor
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and the population (Oputa Panel Rep
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ating consistent numerical data tha
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due to oil distribution. Again, of
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53 Map 2.2 Fatality rates resulting
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Figure 2.5 Number of deaths resulti
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Map 2.4 Fatality rates resulting fr
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Conclusion 59 It is important to st
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Trends and patterns of cattle grazi
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the location of the occurrence of i
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of the lands being equipped with bo
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Jigawa), July (Jigawa and Benue), S
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cattle to graze in violation of the
Page 87 and 88: Map 8. Fatality rates caused by cat
Page 89 and 90: Cattle grazing and lethal violence
Page 91 and 92: BLENCH, R. (2010), Conflict Between
Page 93 and 94: Trends and patterns of fatalities r
Page 95 and 96: Political context of witchcraft and
Page 97 and 98: anyone successful in business or ed
Page 99 and 100: 83 Figure 4.1 Number of violent dea
Page 101 and 102: Okechuku had told the Police that t
Page 103 and 104: The situation in these areas is act
Page 105 and 106: Conclusion 89 Although the media ha
Page 107 and 108: Muslims, Christians and religious V
Page 109 and 110: From this point, the third part of
Page 111 and 112: several incidences of violence inst
Page 113 and 114: violent deaths (Figure 5.2) with th
Page 115 and 116: against the security forces and civ
Page 117 and 118: Figure 5.3 Violent deaths involving
Page 119 and 120: which have a lethal connection betw
Page 121 and 122: nored. Based on the data, they repr
Page 123 and 124: Table 5.3 Violent deaths of Islamic
Page 125 and 126: ment’s JTF to engage members of t
Page 127 and 128: ping demonstrates that religious ca
Page 129 and 130: the intervention of the security fo
Page 131 and 132: Although some of the victims are cr
Page 133 and 134: ‘Court Martial’, respectively,
Page 135 and 136: chosen because the database started
Page 137: an annual average of 59% between Ju
Page 141 and 142: than other of its relations, it wou
Page 143 and 144: tervene more in violent incidents i
Page 145 and 146: tion of the security forces, notabl
Page 147 and 148: Farah Dagogo, a factional leader of
Page 149 and 150: ty outfit in the state, the Special
Page 151 and 152: however, that both the attackers an
Page 153 and 154: to leverage their ethnic and religi
Page 155 and 156: CRIMINAL CODE ACT (1990), Laws of t
Page 157 and 158: Part II Fieldwork and surveys: A qu
Page 159 and 160: A survey of violence-related deaths
Page 161 and 162: Figure 7.1 Percentage of violent de
Page 163 and 164: one. The LGA is included in Enugu E
Page 165 and 166: Table 7.2 Violent events recorded i
Page 171 and 172: Table 7.3 Demographic characteristi
Page 175 and 176: Figure 7.4 Percentage of causes of
Page 177 and 178: A Survey of violence-related deaths
Page 179 and 180: Politically, the LGA is divided int
Page 181 and 182: This has been a source of problems
Page 183 and 184: eferred to as ‘gatekeeping’, an
Page 185 and 186: 169 Data analysis and presentation
Page 187 and 188: Summary of findings As noted earlie
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Table 8.2 Violence types and fatali
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News judgment Reporters, who are th
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cated in Ido-Osun, which were still
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A study of violence-related deaths
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flicts. While most of these fatal i
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tion, as well as poultry farming, c
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Table 9.2 Violent deaths in Kurfi L
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Matazu LGA: Socio-economic, politic
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Table 9.5 Violent deaths in Ingawa
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Ineffective news media coverage as
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State. Until they founded their res
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A study of violence-related deaths
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Gudu, Gwadabawa, Illela and Sakaba:
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market their harvests outside Sakab
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gud
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Table 10.2 Violent incidents in Gud
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwa
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Table 10.3 Violent incidents in Gwa
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Compared with Gudu, Gwadabawa LGA e
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Table 10.4 Violent incidents in Ill
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frequency of incidents, the princip
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er, certain parts of Sakaba are kno
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Postscript: The next challenge: Sta
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Violence in Nigeria

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