Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

The second wave 91
The primary interest for the US was to maintain its right to freely deploy and
use military forces in Okinawa, including nuclear weapons. The advantage that
Okinawa offered lay not only in its strategic location but in the relative freedom it
allowed the US to bring in and store nuclear weapons. This would not have been
possible in mainland Japan.
The National Security Council was deeply concerned about the Japanese public’s
enthusiasm for Okinawa’s return, and about the potentially serious damage that a
US refusal to compromise on this issue might cause to the LDP and Prime Minister
Satō Eisaku’s administration, which was most sympathetic to the US security
interest. The stability of the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governance
of Japan was imperative for the US. It was crucial therefore, for the US to enter
into negotiations over the reversion question with Satō and the LDP, not the
opposition party, and extend Ampo on the condition of US free access to Okinawa,
including the possibility to store nuclear weapons – even if this required the return
of civil administration on Okinawa to Japan (Gabe 2000: 78–9). 32 The logic of
the situation was reasonably straightforward: the status quo in relation to Okinawa
(i.e. direct US administration) was becoming untenable. So if Okinawa had to be
returned to Japan, better that it be returned to a US-friendly Japan on the best
possible of terms than to an unfriendly one on poor terms. So let’s use the politics
of reversion to help our friends. By 1965, not surprisingly, the US state elites
were seriously thinking about the possibility of giving up the direct military
administration over Okinawa. 33
The ‘two laws on education’ struggle
Okinawan schoolteachers played a leading role in the progressive political
campaign for reversion. Their political activities were restricted by firm USCAR
controls, especially on their rights to travel to the mainland. Yet, because of
Okinawa’s separation from Japan, Okinawan teachers had been free from the
different kinds of political control Japan has imposed on mainland schoolteachers.
This started to change, as the contribution to Okinawa’s treasury from Japan
increased. In 1967, the Okinawa Democratic Party and the GRI Education
Department attempted to introduce two education-related legislation bills. The
aim of these bills was, first, to improve working conditions and rewards for
schoolteachers in accordance with mainland Japanese standards. Second, however,
the bills also restricted the Okinawan schoolteachers’ rights to engage in collective
strikes and political actions – again to mainland Japanese levels. Third, they
introduced teachers’ performance evaluation, as in mainland Japan. 34 Of course,
not only the teachers but also the Okinawan community of protest as a whole were
infuriated at this legislation.
On the day the Ryūkyū Legislature was to pass these bills, about 15,000 protesters
demonstrated in the Legislature building and stopped the session (see Figure 6.3).
The protesters included all kinds of workers, union members, and representatives
who came to the Legislature building to support 24 schoolteachers staging a hunger
strike. All the OTA schoolteachers took voluntary annual leave from schools in