Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

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The second wave 91 The primary interest for the US was to maintain its right to freely deploy and use military forces in Okinawa, including nuclear weapons. The advantage that Okinawa offered lay not only in its strategic location but in the relative freedom it allowed the US to bring in and store nuclear weapons. This would not have been possible in mainland Japan. The National Security Council was deeply concerned about the Japanese public’s enthusiasm for Okinawa’s return, and about the potentially serious damage that a US refusal to compromise on this issue might cause to the LDP and Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s administration, which was most sympathetic to the US security interest. The stability of the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governance of Japan was imperative for the US. It was crucial therefore, for the US to enter into negotiations over the reversion question with Satō and the LDP, not the opposition party, and extend Ampo on the condition of US free access to Okinawa, including the possibility to store nuclear weapons – even if this required the return of civil administration on Okinawa to Japan (Gabe 2000: 78–9). 32 The logic of the situation was reasonably straightforward: the status quo in relation to Okinawa (i.e. direct US administration) was becoming untenable. So if Okinawa had to be returned to Japan, better that it be returned to a US-friendly Japan on the best possible of terms than to an unfriendly one on poor terms. So let’s use the politics of reversion to help our friends. By 1965, not surprisingly, the US state elites were seriously thinking about the possibility of giving up the direct military administration over Okinawa. 33 The ‘two laws on education’ struggle Okinawan schoolteachers played a leading role in the progressive political campaign for reversion. Their political activities were restricted by firm USCAR controls, especially on their rights to travel to the mainland. Yet, because of Okinawa’s separation from Japan, Okinawan teachers had been free from the different kinds of political control Japan has imposed on mainland schoolteachers. This started to change, as the contribution to Okinawa’s treasury from Japan increased. In 1967, the Okinawa Democratic Party and the GRI Education Department attempted to introduce two education-related legislation bills. The aim of these bills was, first, to improve working conditions and rewards for schoolteachers in accordance with mainland Japanese standards. Second, however, the bills also restricted the Okinawan schoolteachers’ rights to engage in collective strikes and political actions – again to mainland Japanese levels. Third, they introduced teachers’ performance evaluation, as in mainland Japan. 34 Of course, not only the teachers but also the Okinawan community of protest as a whole were infuriated at this legislation. On the day the Ryūkyū Legislature was to pass these bills, about 15,000 protesters demonstrated in the Legislature building and stopped the session (see Figure 6.3). The protesters included all kinds of workers, union members, and representatives who came to the Legislature building to support 24 schoolteachers staging a hunger strike. All the OTA schoolteachers took voluntary annual leave from schools in
92 Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa protest. As a result, the two education bills were formally discarded in April 1967, which upset the conservative Democratic Party members so much that the members and Legislature Chair were ‘trembling with anger’ (Tōyama 1987: 449). While the OTA was opposed to the mainland Japanese legislation, it aligned itself further with the mainland Japanese teachers’ union, Nikkyōso, a left-wing progressive opponent to the government control on teachers’ political rights. 35 Furthermore, in the process of this struggle, the progressive party and unions’ energy was distracted from the protest against the military bases (Gabe 1969: 298). This ‘two laws on education (kyōkō nihō) struggle’, led by the usually proreversion schoolteachers, was unusual in that it opposed a bill that aimed at Figure 6.3 Demonstrators stop the Two Laws on Education, 24 February 1967 (Source: Sokoku Fukki Tōsōshi Hensan Iinkai 1982b: 107, courtesy of Okinawa Jiji Shuppan)
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Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okina
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Japan’s Economic Power and Securi
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Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okina
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For Peter Makiko and Jun Tanji
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Maps and figures Maps A Ryūkyū Is
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xii Acknowledgements and Asian Hist
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Glossary Ampo US-Japan Mutual Secur
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Kume Okinawa Gunto - Oblique Mercat
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1 Northern Training Area 2 Okuma Re
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1 Introduction A community of prote
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Introduction 3 change, disagreement
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Introduction 5 protest community te
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Introduction 7 common, invisible el
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Introduction 9 protests and uprisin
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2 Diversity and unity in the commun
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Diversity and unity 13 industrial s
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Diversity and unity 15 RMT can argu
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Diversity and unity 17 But how, if
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everywhere but most often it ‘pre
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3 Annexation and assimilation Intro
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Annexation and assimilation 23 nine
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economy. Indeed, Japan turned on it
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Annexation and assimilation 27 124)
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Annexation and assimilation 29 Okin
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Annexation and assimilation 31 Jaha
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Annexation and assimilation 33 fund
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Annexation and assimilation 35 fiss
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In relation to the wider theme of t
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The Battle of Okinawa 39 told the r
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Page 64 and 65: The Battle of Okinawa 43 staged a c
Page 66 and 67: The Battle of Okinawa 45 In 1983, C
Page 68 and 69: The Battle of Okinawa 47 anti-war a
Page 70 and 71: The Battle of Okinawa 49 included d
Page 72 and 73: alterations and the way in which th
Page 74 and 75: 5 The first wave Opposition to US m
Page 76 and 77: The first wave 55 military basicall
Page 78 and 79: The first wave 57 Another major loc
Page 80 and 81: The first wave 59 much money do the
Page 82 and 83: The first wave 61 members’ speech
Page 84 and 85: The first wave 63 of twenty years.
Page 86 and 87: The first wave 65 GRI Chief Executi
Page 88 and 89: N Barbed wire fence 0 1 km The firs
Page 90 and 91: The first wave 69 Figure 5.1 Beggar
Page 92 and 93: chan incident’ after the name of
Page 94 and 95: The first wave 73 Price-Report rall
Page 96 and 97: 1955 (Ahagon 1998 [1992]: 32). 44 T
Page 98 and 99: 6 The second wave Introduction Towa
Page 100 and 101: The second wave 79 improved materia
Page 102 and 103: ested with the High Commissioner (R
Page 104 and 105: The second wave 83 the arbitrary US
Page 106 and 107: The second wave 85 Kenrōkyō. The
Page 108 and 109: The second wave 87 affirmation of u
Page 110 and 111: Figure 6.2 Okinawan citizens’ ral
Page 114 and 115: introducing the mainland Japanese e
Page 116 and 117: The second wave 95 to reconsider re
Page 118 and 119: The second wave 97 meant to be ‘O
Page 120 and 121: The second wave 99 clear that Okina
Page 122 and 123: The second wave 101 The choice the
Page 124 and 125: The second wave 103 war zone (Ryūk
Page 126 and 127: Gendered bodies and physical identi
Page 128 and 129: wave’ of Okinawans’ island-wide
Page 130 and 131: Iken Kyōtō: successor to the Coun
Page 132 and 133: The anti-war landowners 111 reversi
Page 134 and 135: - an original member of the One-tsu
Page 136 and 137: The anti-war landowners 115 been en
Page 138 and 139: The anti-war landowners 117 Butai K
Page 140 and 141: The anti-war landowners 119 Air Bas
Page 142 and 143: The anti-war landowners 121 refusal
Page 144 and 145: The anti-war landowners 123 Marxist
Page 146 and 147: fear of delaying Okinawa’s revers
Page 148 and 149: 8 Kin Bay and Shiraho Introduction
Page 150 and 151: 124ºE 24º30’N 0 20 km N ISHIGAK
Page 152 and 153: Kin Bay and Shiraho 131 one of the
Page 154 and 155: Kin Bay and Shiraho 133 In Ishigaki
Page 156 and 157: Kin Bay and Shiraho 135 We have see
Page 158 and 159: Kin Bay and Shiraho 137 parties wer
Page 160 and 161: Kin Bay and Shiraho 139 Figure 8.1
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Kin Bay and Shiraho 141 Konwa-kai).
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Kin Bay and Shiraho 143 required in
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Kin Bay and Shiraho 145 communicati
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thinks that the Shiraho struggle ag
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Kin Bay and Shiraho 149 mainland Ja
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different kinds of activity in poli
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The third wave and beyond 153 Nairo
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The third wave and beyond 155 viole
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The third wave and beyond 157 have
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The third wave and beyond 159 incid
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Earlier in September after the rape
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The third wave and beyond 163 Conse
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The third wave and beyond 165 refer
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The third wave and beyond 167 In Ju
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The third wave and beyond 169 great
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Figure 9.1 Koe, Koe, Koe (courtesy
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The third wave and beyond 173 the r
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The third wave and beyond 175 to li
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Conclusion The expression ‘Okinaw
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Conclusion 179 Diet, the central go
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Notes 1 Introduction: a community o
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Notes 183 8 Related to this point,
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24 This locates his argument in lin
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Notes 187 21 Since 1965, Ienaga has
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Notes 189 a foreign - even imperial
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39 Subsequent to the defection of t
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Notes 193 poor public transport and
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Notes 195 his project of collecting
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Notes 197 11 The new law responded
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Notes 199 32 At the time, the US wa
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Notes 201 25 Ui Jun is a scientist
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Notes 203 9 Former Governor Nishime
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Notes 205 Taimususha 1998: 51). Tha
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activities and advises Washington o
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Bibliography 209 Arakawa, A. (2000a
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Bibliography 211 Dower, J. (1971)
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Bibliography 213 Hiyane, T. (1982)
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Bibliography 215 Kawamitsu, S. (199
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Bibliography 217 Melucci, A. (1989)
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Bibliography 219 on the Application
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Bibliography 221 President Nixon an
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Bibliography 223 Region) (Research
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Yamanouchi, Y. (1996) Shisutemu Sha
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Index ‘A’ sign businesses 80, 1
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Funabashi, Y. 155 Futenma air base
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Nago City 49, 178 Nago heliport str
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Ryūkyū kingdom 21, 22-3, 183-4 Ry
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