Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

178 Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa
commitment of all members of the community of protest, regardless of their specific
difference in political, ideological, or practical orientation.
Some Okinawans have attempted to accept their ‘fate’ realistically, even positively
– focusing on business opportunities, Japanese special subsidies, and the rent that
the bases in Okinawa generate. For example, in 2000, three Ryūkyū University
professors (academic advisers to Governor Inamine) advocated the ‘Okinawa
Initiative’ in accepting ‘their role as host to the bases as the only economically viable
option’ (Yonetani 2003b: 251). 2 As Yonetani (2003b) carefully demonstrates,
the ‘Okinawa Initiative’ reveals that the political economy of bases is intricately
connected to the way Okinawans understand and interpret the past. The ‘Okinawa
Initiative’s’ framing of the past – which also characterizes the local conservative
political wing – dismisses ‘emotional’ focus on Okinawa’s victimization. Particularly
controversial are representations of the Japanese state and military’s abuse and
murder of local residents during the Battle of Okinawa. 3 The ‘Okinawa Initiative’
protagonists recognize the validity of Okinawan history of marginalization –
including forceful US land acquisition during the postwar occupation, the 1972
Okinawa reversion deal that permanently entrenched the US military presence, and
the 1995 rape incident. Yet they argue that the anti-base Okinawans’ constant
reference to it leads only to a futile and never-ending political opposition (Maeshiro
et al. 1998: 24). Instead ‘Okinawa Initiative’ recommends that Okinawans see the
bases as ‘assets’ that demonstrate Okinawa’s ‘greatest contribution’ to the US–Japan
security alliance, and to the nation’s defence. The ‘Initiative’ ideologically resonates
well with twenty-first century mainland Japanese neo-nationalism that glorifies
Japan’s wartime past and rejects the ‘masochistic’ admission of its past atrocities
(Yonetani 2003b: 254–55). Despite this, the military bases have come to be understood
mainly as an economic issue and their association with war downplayed. The
late Prime Minister Obuchi’s selection of Nago as the host city of the Kyushu–
Okinawa G8 Summit in 2000 reinforced this perspective. So did the introduction
of a new ¥2,000 bill decorated with the ancient Ryūkyūan court’s Shurei Gate. 4 In
this political climate, local anti-base protest momentum plummeted in the late 1990s
and early 2000s.
Regardless of their differences in framings and styles of collective action, the
actors in the community of protest all reject the revisionist attempt to rewrite history.
The abuse and marginalization of ‘Okinawa’ are events not of the past but of the
present, in the form of an all-consuming monster of war machinery. The commitment
to represent local experiences of human suffering is the bottom line of collective
identity – a common definition of who ‘we’ are – that binds the community of protest.
Yet a consensus at this level does not promise integration of protest – organizationally
or strategically – into a unified ‘movement’.
In 2003, Arasaki lamented the lack of prospect for another all-island Okinawan
mass protest movement. According to Arasaki, this is because all the democratic
avenues for protest – using legal actions and claiming legally protected rights – had
been closed. In the late 1990s, the ‘third-wave’ struggle made its mark with
Governor Ōta’s refusal to authorize the US military’s legal contract to use the
anti-war military landowners’ property. However, using the majority votes in the