Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

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124ºE 24º30’N 0 20 km N ISHIGAKI ISLAND Ishigaki City Kin Bay and Shiraho 129 Shiraho Map 8.2 Ishigaki Island and Shiraho (Courtesy of Vivian Forbes) however, were largely caused by the massively increased inflows of Japanese subsidies and inflation of the value of private properties occupied by the military bases. The Okinwan economy remains heavily dependent on the presence of military bases indirectly. The achievement of income levels and a standard of living equivalent to mainland Japan (‘hondo-nami’) became the slogan of the Okinawan and central government officials and the business sector. The Okinawa Development Agency (Okinawa kaihatsu chō) was set up within the Cabinet, and a Special Law for Okinawa’s Regeneration and Development (Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu tokubetsuhō) was enacted in 1971. According to this Special Law, the Okinawa Development Agency developed the first Okinawa Regeneration and Development Plan (Okinawa shinkō
130 Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa kaihatsu keikaku), 2 starting from the year of reversion, 1972, to be implemented by the prefecture government, under the guidance of the Okinawa Development Agency. 3 This Plan was a revival of the Okinawan Industrial Promotion Plan (Okinawa Keizai Shinkō Keikaku), implemented in 1932 (see Chapter 3). After reversion, this scheme has helped secure Okinawa’s support for Japan’s security policy, mainly in the form, this time, of hosting US military bases. 4 How was support entrenched? Essentially by using financial assistance to create economic dependence on subsidies and rent generated by the acceptance of hosting the bases. 5 If the Okinawan Industrial Promotion Plan had created an independent economy that no longer required governmental subsidies, would Okinawa still accept the continuing heavy US military presence? The structural economic dependence has made it very difficult for the Okinawans, especially Okinawan governors, not to co-operate with the Japanese government’s security policy. Former GRI Chief Executive Yara Chōbyō was re-elected as Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in 1972. The Japanese government’s development policy, specifically claimed to be designed to incorporate Okinawa into Japan’s rapid economic growth during the 1960s, appealed to the local population. The new Okinawa Prefecture Government was under pressure to promote a ‘hondo-nami’ (modelled on mainland Japan) industrialization, the strongest emphasis of Yara’s post-reversion policy. Yara was nevertheless concerned about his lack of experience in economic matters. 6 His administration declared the construction of Central Terminal Station (CTS) as strategically necessary for Okinawa’s industrialization (Yara 1985: 218–21) and there were a number of reasons for this. First and most obviously, CTS was intended to increase Okinwa’s crude oil storage capacity. Second, in 1971, the Okinawa Development Agency has designated energy intensive oil and aluminium refining as key future industries for Okinawa. In short, oil was essential. However, political factors were also involved in the choice of Okinawa for heavy industrial sites: the heightened and heightening awareness of mainland Japanese residents of pollution problems in local communities. There were about three thousand residents’ organizations in Japan in 1972 (Kurihara 1999: 12), and environmental pollution was their major concern. (Krauss and Simcock 1980: 187). Residents’ victories in major litigation against big companies and the state had gained publicity, increased public awareness of environmental problems, and demonstrated the capacity of residents for effective political action (Broadbent 1998, Krauss and Simcock 1980, McKean 1981). 7 Despite this, building the CTS was considered essential – especially given the advent of the oil crisis in 1973. Okinawa – with its pristine natural environment unaffected yet by rapid industrialization – was thus targeted. In Yakena district, a municipality facing Kin Bay and directly connected to Henza Island by the ‘ocean road’, the mayor and commercial organizations were eager to attract petroleum industries. However, repeated oil leakage incidents from the tankers had already been causing damage to the ocean and local fishery to an extent that was visually obvious to the local residents. In October 1971, for example, at
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Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okina
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Japan’s Economic Power and Securi
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Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okina
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For Peter Makiko and Jun Tanji
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Maps and figures Maps A Ryūkyū Is
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xii Acknowledgements and Asian Hist
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Glossary Ampo US-Japan Mutual Secur
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Kume Okinawa Gunto - Oblique Mercat
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1 Northern Training Area 2 Okuma Re
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1 Introduction A community of prote
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Introduction 3 change, disagreement
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Introduction 5 protest community te
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Introduction 7 common, invisible el
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Introduction 9 protests and uprisin
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2 Diversity and unity in the commun
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Diversity and unity 13 industrial s
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Diversity and unity 15 RMT can argu
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Diversity and unity 17 But how, if
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everywhere but most often it ‘pre
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3 Annexation and assimilation Intro
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Annexation and assimilation 23 nine
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economy. Indeed, Japan turned on it
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Annexation and assimilation 27 124)
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Annexation and assimilation 29 Okin
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Annexation and assimilation 31 Jaha
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Annexation and assimilation 33 fund
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Annexation and assimilation 35 fiss
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In relation to the wider theme of t
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The Battle of Okinawa 39 told the r
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a 17,900-square-metres space with 1
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The Battle of Okinawa 43 staged a c
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The Battle of Okinawa 45 In 1983, C
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The Battle of Okinawa 47 anti-war a
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The Battle of Okinawa 49 included d
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alterations and the way in which th
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5 The first wave Opposition to US m
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The first wave 55 military basicall
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The first wave 57 Another major loc
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The first wave 59 much money do the
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The first wave 61 members’ speech
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The first wave 63 of twenty years.
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The first wave 65 GRI Chief Executi
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N Barbed wire fence 0 1 km The firs
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The first wave 69 Figure 5.1 Beggar
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chan incident’ after the name of
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The first wave 73 Price-Report rall
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1955 (Ahagon 1998 [1992]: 32). 44 T
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6 The second wave Introduction Towa
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Page 102 and 103: ested with the High Commissioner (R
Page 104 and 105: The second wave 83 the arbitrary US
Page 106 and 107: The second wave 85 Kenrōkyō. The
Page 108 and 109: The second wave 87 affirmation of u
Page 110 and 111: Figure 6.2 Okinawan citizens’ ral
Page 112 and 113: The second wave 91 The primary inte
Page 114 and 115: introducing the mainland Japanese e
Page 116 and 117: The second wave 95 to reconsider re
Page 118 and 119: The second wave 97 meant to be ‘O
Page 120 and 121: The second wave 99 clear that Okina
Page 122 and 123: The second wave 101 The choice the
Page 124 and 125: The second wave 103 war zone (Ryūk
Page 126 and 127: Gendered bodies and physical identi
Page 128 and 129: wave’ of Okinawans’ island-wide
Page 130 and 131: Iken Kyōtō: successor to the Coun
Page 132 and 133: The anti-war landowners 111 reversi
Page 134 and 135: - an original member of the One-tsu
Page 136 and 137: The anti-war landowners 115 been en
Page 138 and 139: The anti-war landowners 117 Butai K
Page 140 and 141: The anti-war landowners 119 Air Bas
Page 142 and 143: The anti-war landowners 121 refusal
Page 144 and 145: The anti-war landowners 123 Marxist
Page 146 and 147: fear of delaying Okinawa’s revers
Page 148 and 149: 8 Kin Bay and Shiraho Introduction
Page 152 and 153: Kin Bay and Shiraho 131 one of the
Page 154 and 155: Kin Bay and Shiraho 133 In Ishigaki
Page 156 and 157: Kin Bay and Shiraho 135 We have see
Page 158 and 159: Kin Bay and Shiraho 137 parties wer
Page 160 and 161: Kin Bay and Shiraho 139 Figure 8.1
Page 162 and 163: Kin Bay and Shiraho 141 Konwa-kai).
Page 164 and 165: Kin Bay and Shiraho 143 required in
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Page 168 and 169: thinks that the Shiraho struggle ag
Page 170 and 171: Kin Bay and Shiraho 149 mainland Ja
Page 172 and 173: different kinds of activity in poli
Page 174 and 175: The third wave and beyond 153 Nairo
Page 176 and 177: The third wave and beyond 155 viole
Page 178 and 179: The third wave and beyond 157 have
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Page 198 and 199: Conclusion The expression ‘Okinaw
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Conclusion 179 Diet, the central go
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Notes 1 Introduction: a community o
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Notes 183 8 Related to this point,
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24 This locates his argument in lin
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Notes 187 21 Since 1965, Ienaga has
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Notes 189 a foreign - even imperial
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39 Subsequent to the defection of t
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Notes 193 poor public transport and
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Notes 195 his project of collecting
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Notes 197 11 The new law responded
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Notes 199 32 At the time, the US wa
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Notes 201 25 Ui Jun is a scientist
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Notes 203 9 Former Governor Nishime
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Notes 205 Taimususha 1998: 51). Tha
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activities and advises Washington o
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Bibliography 209 Arakawa, A. (2000a
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Bibliography 211 Dower, J. (1971)
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Bibliography 213 Hiyane, T. (1982)
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Bibliography 215 Kawamitsu, S. (199
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Bibliography 217 Melucci, A. (1989)
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Bibliography 219 on the Application
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Bibliography 221 President Nixon an
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Bibliography 223 Region) (Research
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Yamanouchi, Y. (1996) Shisutemu Sha
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Index ‘A’ sign businesses 80, 1
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Funabashi, Y. 155 Futenma air base
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Nago City 49, 178 Nago heliport str
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Ryūkyū kingdom 21, 22-3, 183-4 Ry
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