Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

206 Notes
37 Signatures from one-third of the population were enough to request the mayor’s
resignation: ‘this was a warning towards the mayor: it showed our capacity to collect
signatures for his resignation’ (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999:
46). There were 18 ruling party members of Nago City Assembly who were against the
referendum before the signature collection, as opposed to 11 who supported it. However,
given the number of the signatures, both the mayor and the ruling party members were
pressured to pass the regulation (Nago Shimin Tōhyō Hōkokushū Kankō Iinkai 1999:
46–7).
38 However, the campaign for the Nago mayor election, subsequent to the referendum
and Higa’s resignation, was a different story. Veteran party and union members excluded
inexperienced ‘citizens’ from the selection process of an anti-heliport candidate. On
this occasion, the progressive political parties and unions’ election expertise and
organizational interests dominated the campaign (Kyoda 1998). A Jannukai member
recalls not being able to conduct their original activities (Mashiki et al. 1999). ‘Unity’
of the anti-heliport coalition was achieved under the top-down, hierarchical (mostly
male-seniority) order.
39 There were experienced female activists in Nago, such as members of women’s divisions
of regional workers’ unions, local women’s associations or other older organizations
such as Okifuren and NJWA.
40 Wives of anti-war landowners and anti-base activists discuss their experiences in Ikehara
et al. 1996.
41 In January 1998, the Reach to the Heart Women’s Voice Network met Ōta at the lobby
of the Prefecture Hall, and asked him not to accept the new base. This was a spectacular
event, with the lobby filled up with 300 women (Kunimasa, Interview, May 1999).
Governor Ōta had made difficult decisions to mend relationships with Tokyo, to save
the local economy from subsidies drying up, by being more moderate on the base issues.
Subsequently, Ōta readjusted his position on the heliport, and expressed his opposition
officially, even though the connection of the two events was unclear. Following this,
the Network members did a michi junay in the streets of Ginza in Tokyo. They made it
into a performance of a sale of the new base, with the premium of government’s special
subsidies, in a tarai (washing basin), playing a pun on tarai mawashi (passing from
one place to another) of Futenma Base. As of 2005 the Network is still active. In July
they did another michi junay in Naha.
42 In total, 82.45 per cent (31,477 votes) of the eligible voters cast their votes. The
breakdown of the votes was: (1) I agree with the construction plan . . . 8 per cent, (2)
I agree because the environmental measures and economic improvement can be expected
. . . 37 per cent, (3) I oppose the construction plan . . . 52 per cent, (4) I oppose because
environmental measures and economic improvements cannot be expected . . . 1 per cent,
(5) Invalid 1 per cent.
43 The Referendum Promotion Council renamed itself the Anti-Heliport Coalition (Heliport
Hantai Kyōgikai).
44 Helen Marsh at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, who has visited
Okinawa and given seminars, is one of the regular supporters (Save the Dugong
Campaign Centre 2002: 4).
45 See, for example, Save the Dugong Campaign Centre 2002, 2003; World Conservation
Union (IUCN) 2001.
46 Following the IUCN meeting, Miyagi Yasuhiro of SDCC and Ōnishi Masayuki, a
linguistics professor at Meiō University in Nago, developed a support network with the
Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and the Centre for Marine Conservation.
Also, Miyagi and Ōnishi travelled to Washington to talk to the president and vice
president of the Marine Mammal Commission who planned to investigate and write
reports about the dugongs (Marine Mammal Commission March 2001: 129–30). The
Commission is an independent administrative body that monitors US government