Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa

The first wave 55
military basically viewed land in Okinawa as justly acquired by the sacrifice and
casualties of American youth in the Battle of Okinawa.
While residents and those who returned from mainland Japan were accommodated
in internment camps, the US military occupied 45,000 acres of land for
base construction. The area chosen was mostly farmlands, for the military required
flat, open land surfaces, which were relatively scarce on Okinawa Main Island. In
the central region of Okinawa Island huge land tracts were enclosed by barbed wire
fences and many residents never returned to their original homes (Arasaki 1995:
23). Ie-jima was out of this region but was one of the areas targeted by the US
because of its relatively flat land surface – suitable for shooting ranges and airfields.
In Ie-jima, Ahagon recalled that the farmers were so naive and ignorant that
they believed that, if they co-operated with the US military, the Americans would
help the villagers recover from the war. Maja farmers were first glad it was the
Americans, not the Japanese, who won the war. The Japanese soldiers had treated
Ie-jima residents with contempt, killed them, and subjected them to harsh labour
during the war. ‘We thought of American democracy and Lincoln, and met with
the US delegates in Ie-jima who seemed much more generous and civilised than
what they had been told about the Americans before the war’ (Ahagon 1973: 21).
In August 1948, RYCOM set up four locally elected legislatures and executive
institutions and governors, representing each guntō (groups of islands) of the
Okinawa, Yaeyama, Amami, and Miyako region (see Maps B and C). This was a
move to prevent the locals’ discontent and limit growing communist influence,
which was already prevalent (Miyazato 2000: 32–5). At the same time, RYCOM
acted to limit further the civil and political rights of the residents and restricted
their activities. A draconian criminal law was introduced. This restricted freedom
of publications, travel, and any organized political activities. Navy commander
Watkins famously compared the Okinawan local autonomy to that of a mouse,
free only to the extent that the cat (the US military government) allows (Kano 1987:
69). 4 When the Army took over from the Navy, US control over Okinawa was
further upgraded.
The US authorities defended the legitimacy of the acquisition of land that
belonged to the locals by stressing the strategic importance of Okinawa’s location
for defending regional security against the communist bloc. 5 By 1949, a consensus
was reached within the US government on the vital importance of Okinawa as a
US security outpost, should Cold War hostilities escalate (Eldridge 2001: 233).
As the Cold War took clearer shape with the 1949 revolution and establishment of
the People’s Republic of China, the US State Department and Congress approved
the allocation of a $58 million US federal budget for base construction on Okinawa
(Dower 1971: 193). From the newly constructed US bases in Okinawa, B-29s
were already raiding North Korea, contributing to the Korean War that started in
1950 (Miyazato 2000: 49). Initially, no compensation was paid to Okinawan
landowners for their extensive land losses.
As of 15 December 1950, the military government changed its name to the US
Civil Administration of the Ryūkyū Islands (USCAR) and in April 1952 USCAR
created a local executive administration, 6 the Government of the Ryūkyū Islands