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Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement<br />

5. Assess Scope of, And Respond to, Importer<br />

Identity Theft in the Trade Environment.<br />

As part of a layered risk-management approach<br />

to customs enforcement, CBP is continuously<br />

incorporating data generated through its targeting<br />

programs to establish optimal levels of screening<br />

scrutiny for particular shipments. As a way to evade law<br />

enforcement detection, counterfeit syndicates are known<br />

to steal the identifications of legitimate importers with<br />

strong shipment integrity track records in order to move<br />

containers more easily under those false identities.<br />

Especially vulnerable are known and trusted shippers<br />

who have earned tangible importation benefits such<br />

as expedited cargo clearance. Counterfeit syndicates<br />

obtain identifications of legitimate importers and<br />

submit falsified documentation to gain release of their<br />

merchandise at the border. By posing as the known<br />

importer, illicit traders may swiftly move large quantities<br />

of high-value goods into U.S. and world commerce.<br />

Not enough information is publically available to<br />

assess the scope and impact of importer identity theft<br />

domestically, or how criminal syndicates may use the<br />

tactic globally. As a result of some globally coordinated<br />

enforcement operations, preliminary evidence<br />

suggests that the tactic may be widely used, including<br />

in combination with other obfuscation schemes (see<br />

sidebar). 13 Enhanced international collaboration and<br />

information sharing would increase U.S. and other<br />

customs authorities’ ability to safeguard against crossborder<br />

illicit trade.<br />

“Operation GRYPHON”<br />

World Customs Organization (WCO)<br />

Global Cooperation: 93 national Customs<br />

administrations, coordinated by the WCO, took<br />

part in the Operation beginning in October 2013.<br />

Scope: Focus on trade in illicit tobacco across<br />

the range of customs control and clearance<br />

processes, including within duty-free outlets, free<br />

trade zones (FTZs), bonded warehouses, and<br />

means of transport.<br />

Seizures: 593 million cigarettes, 77 tons of smoking<br />

tobacco, 31 tons of raw tobacco, 15 tons of water<br />

pipe tobacco, 5 tons of chewing tobacco, and 2.5<br />

tons of hand rolling and pipe tobacco.<br />

Criminal Tactics: Counterfeit cigarettes were<br />

transported in sea containers, as well as by land<br />

transport (trains and trucks). Operation GRYPHON<br />

confirmed that:<br />

• Identity Theft: Criminals engaged in “identity<br />

theft” by using the identities of import and<br />

export companies with good reputations as<br />

a method to avoid raising the suspicion of<br />

customs officials.<br />

• Free Trade Zones (FTZs): FTZs played an<br />

important role in the illicit smuggling schemes.<br />

Consignments arriving in these zones were<br />

subsequently repacked into other containers,<br />

enabling the illicit cigarettes to be lost or<br />

disappear. They then exited the zone as lowvalue<br />

goods, either misdeclared or concealed in<br />

other shipments.<br />

SECTION 3<br />

ACTION NO. 3.10: Consultation with private<br />

sector stakeholders on the prevalence and<br />

nature of, and responses to, importer identity<br />

theft. Within 18 months of the issuance of this<br />

Plan, ICE and CBP will consult with private sector<br />

stakeholders on the prevalence and nature<br />

of – and responses to – importer identity theft,<br />

including: (1) tactics employed by illicit actors to<br />

gain access to identifications of known importers;<br />

(2) current efforts by the private sector to reduce<br />

the incidence of importer identity theft; and (3)<br />

possible options for changes to current Federal<br />

and private-sector processes to reduce the<br />

incidence of importer identity theft.<br />

• Conflict Zones: A large volume of containers was<br />

destined for conflict areas, such as Afghanistan,<br />

Syria, and Ukraine. Twenty-one containers bound<br />

for Syria could not be traced after arriving in<br />

the country – a clear case of smugglers taking<br />

advantage of conflict zones, where customs<br />

controls may be in temporary disarray.<br />

See, e.g., World Customs Organization, “WCO News,”<br />

at p. 7 (October 2014), accessed from http://www.<br />

wcoomd.org/en/media/wco-news-magazine/previous/~/<br />

media/1B6D8A89F61142AC9F4ADB8678DEF5C9.pdf; see<br />

also United States Department of State, “The Global Illicit<br />

Trade In Tobacco: A Threat To National Security,” at p. 19<br />

(December 2015), accessed from http://www.state.gov/<br />

documents/organization/250513.pdf.<br />

100

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