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International Trade - Theory and Policy, 2010a

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3.3 Example of a <strong>Trade</strong> Pattern<br />

LEARNING OBJECTIVE<br />

1. Learn how to describe a mutually voluntary exchange pattern <strong>and</strong> specify both the<br />

terms of trade <strong>and</strong> the final consumption bundles for two traders.<br />

Suppose after some discussion Farmer Smith <strong>and</strong> Farmer Jones agree to amutually voluntary exchange of<br />

six apples for six oranges (see Figure 3.1 "Two-Farmer <strong>Trade</strong> Pattern"). The terms of trade is six apples per<br />

six oranges, or one apple per orange. After trade, Farmer Smith will have four oranges <strong>and</strong> six apples to<br />

consume, while Farmer Jones will have six oranges <strong>and</strong> four apples to consume. As long as the trade is<br />

voluntary, it must hold that both farmers expect to be better off after trade since they are free not to trade.<br />

Thus mutually voluntary trade must be beneficial for both farmers.<br />

Figure 3.1 Two-Farmer <strong>Trade</strong> Patter<br />

Sometimes people talk about trade as if it were adversarial, with one side competing against the other.<br />

With this impression, one might believe that trade would generate a winner <strong>and</strong> a loser as if trade were a<br />

contest. However, a pure exchange model demonstrates that trade is not a zero-sum game. Instead, when<br />

Saylor URL: http://www.saylor.org/books<br />

Saylor.org<br />

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