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International Trade - Theory and Policy, 2010a

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Administrative costs of tariffs <strong>and</strong> quotas are also likely to differ. Tariff collection involves product<br />

identification, collection, <strong>and</strong> processing of fees. Quota administration will also involve product<br />

identification <strong>and</strong> some method of keeping track of, or counting, the product as it enters the country in<br />

multiple ports of entry. It may also involve some method of auctioning or disbursing quota tickets. It is<br />

not obvious which of these two procedures would be less costly, although a good guess would be tariff<br />

collection.<br />

Perhaps the most important distinction between the two policies, however, is the protective effect the<br />

policy has on the import-competing industries. In one sense, quotas are more protective of the domestic<br />

industry because they limit the extent of import competition to a fixed maximum quantity. The quota<br />

provides an upper bound to the foreign competition the domestic industries will face. In contrast, tariffs<br />

simply raise the price but do not limit the degree of competition or trade volume to any particular level.<br />

In the original General Agreement on Tariffs <strong>and</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> (GATT), a preference for the application of tariffs<br />

rather than quotas was introduced as a guiding principle. One reason was the sense that tariffs allowed for<br />

more market flexibility <strong>and</strong> thus could be expected to be less protective over time. Another reason<br />

concerned transparency. With a quota in place, it is very difficult to discern the degree to which a market<br />

is protected since it can be difficult to measure how far the quota is below the free trade import level. With<br />

a tariff in place, especially an ad valorem tariff, one can use the tariff percentage as a measure of the<br />

degree of protection.<br />

Also, it was considered somewhat easier to negotiate reductions in tariff rates than quota increases during<br />

GATT rounds of trade liberalization. Again, the issue of transparency arises. <strong>Trade</strong> liberalization<br />

agreements generally target a fixed percentage for tariff reductions. For example, countries might agree to<br />

reduce average tariffs by 30 percent from their current levels. This rule would be perceived as being equal<br />

reciprocation in that each country would be liberalizing to the same degree. Hence the agreement could be<br />

judged to be fair. However, with quotas in place, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply such a<br />

straightforward type of fairness principle.<br />

For this reason, current World <strong>Trade</strong> Organization (WTO) member countries agreed in the Uruguay<br />

Round to phase out the use of quotas, used primarily in agriculture industries. Instead, countries will<br />

apply tariffs that are equivalent in their market effects to the original quotas. This adjustment is referred<br />

Saylor URL: http://www.saylor.org/books<br />

Saylor.org<br />

364

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