The Gateway Chronicle 2020

62
England was dissolving into factionalism
and disarray, such debt became an unacceptable
and critical problem for the
crown’s power. Therefore, military failure,
seen particularly in the 1453 losses in
France, was detrimental to the crown’s
power through increasing factionalism
and crippling finances.
However,
a
lack of
military
focus by
a king in
the 1400s
could
also be a good thing. The 1453 loss of
France may even be considered a watershed
moment which increased the crown’s
success. Indeed, after 1453, Edward IV
was unwilling to fight in France and more
open to diplomacy: the 1475 Treaty of Picquigny
not only brought about a sevenyear
truce, but also financially benefitted
the crown in providing Edward with an
annual pension of £10,000. Therefore, for
the rest of his reign, Edward had little to
fear from the French, was financially
strengthened and was able to focus more
on domestic policy, such as the improvement
of law and order with regional councils
and the increased use of JPs. But while
the loss of France may have been a significantly
positive, large-scale and enduring
change in this regard, it is more accurate
to assert that Edward IV’s domestic success
was more due to his own skill and
adeptness than the French losses of 1453.
Ultimately, therefore, military success was
certainly the key factor in securing the
king’s power and authority.
“both domestic and foreign military
operations essentially required
money and men”
However, such military success would be
impossible without underpinning support
of the nobility and parliament. Indeed,
both foreign and domestic military operations
essentially required money and men.
For example, Henry IV’s victory against
the Scottish at Homildon Hill in 1402 relied
on both military support from the
noble Percy family and parliament granting
a subsidy of a tenth and a fifteenth at
the September meeting, which demonstrates
how parliament and noble support
were important underpinning factors in
securing the king’s success and strength.
Parliament also exercised power to more
directly secure or threaten a king’s authority:
the ‘Parliament of Devils’
in 1459 saw leading
Yorkist nobles convicted of
high treason, thereby fortifying
Henry VI’s authority
as king, while through the
Act of Accord in 1460,
where the Duke of York
was made heir to the
throne, Henry VI’s authority was severely
undermined as his son was disinherited in
favour of a future Yorkist dynasty.
Furthermore, parliament demonstrated its
willingness and power to destruct the
king’s authority in January 1450 with the
demanding that Suffolk, the ‘royal puppeteer’
of
Henry VI’s
government,
be tried for
treason, despite
the
king’s support
for him.
With Suffolk’s
subsequent
exile,
it’s clear that
without parliamentary
support, the
king’s authority
could easily
be overturned.
The nobility
was also important,
jurisdiction to nobles
Henry V drew authority from his ability to delegate
moreover, in
keeping law and order in the localities.