Spain and the United States - Real Instituto Elcano

OVERVIEW 31
forces were not happy at the democratic direction in which the country was
moving, and on February 23, 1981 members of the Civil Guard, headed by Lt.
Col. Antonio Tejero, stormed the Spanish parliament as part of a failed coup.
Instead of rallying to the support of the beleaguered government, the US
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, a former general, said the coup was “a
Spanish internal affair.” This unfortunate remark confirmed the belief of the
Spanish left, and democrats as a whole, that the US government placed little
importance on the fate of Spanish democracy and that it still hankered after the
cosy relationship it had during the Franco regime. The left was also
antagonised by the heavy-handed US intervention in Central America during
the early 1980s, following the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. The centrist
government of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo pressed ahead, and in May 1982 Spain
entered NATO. The October general election, however, was overwhelmingly
won by the Socialists, who were against NATO membership and committed to
submitting the issue to a referendum.
8. The watershed 1988 bases agreement
The Socialists, in a policy U-turn, campaigned, to the great relief of the US
government, for a “yes” vote in the 1986 referendum on NATO membership
(their campaign slogan was “In the interest of Spain”) and they won the day
(52.5% in favour and 39.8% against). But they attached three conditions to the
irritation of Washington: Spain would not join NATO’s integrated military
structure; the ban on nuclear weapons in Spain would remain and, most
importantly, there would be a gradual reduction of the US military presence in
Spain including the F-16 jet fighters. For the Socialists, overcoming the
Francoist origin of the bilateral agreement would only be achieved by reducing
the US presence and not just by joining NATO. What Kissinger had feared in
1970 and 1974 would now come to pass.
Prime Minister Felipe González set the tone for the negotiations in a
seminal speech in Washington in September 1985: “We should not be surprised
that those defeated in the Civil War and the democratic opposition in general
should have viewed the treaties as American support for the dictatorship and a
blow for the hopes of a rapid democratic restoration in Spain.” The Socialists,
emboldened by NATO membership and entry into the European Community,
which made Spain a much more attractive country for the United States as it
consolidated Spain’s market economy and democracy, took a tough position in
the arduous 1986-88 round of negotiations. They pressed for a much more
balanced relationship and made it clear from the outset that if no agreement
was reached by the time the accord expired in May 1988 the United States