Spain and the United States - Real Instituto Elcano

OVERVIEW 35
sovereign Basque state). 32 Spain also secured its objective of annual summit
meetings with the United States (at the level of foreign affairs representatives).
In return, Madrid granted the American request, formulated in 1998, to
extend the facilities at the Rota base, including the construction of 16 hangars
for Galaxy strategic transport planes and the further development of fuel
installations and docks. Rota provides a strategic bridgehead for the United
States in the case of military interventions in the Middle East and beyond.
Protection of the Straits of Gibraltar, the most important waterway with a daily
traffic of 220 large vessels, is basically guaranteed by the US forces at Rota.
When George W. Bush arrived at the White House, Aznar, decided to press
for the Spanish equivalent of the United Kingdom’s “special” relationship with
Washington. This significant shift in Spanish foreign policy broke with the
post-Franco, essentially European-focused policy, partly forged because of the
overriding priority of joining the European Union, although there was also a
strong Atlanticist component. Aznar had become increasingly disillusioned
with the policies of the German and French governments and their
predominant role in the EU. A closer relationship with Washington was also a
way to escape from their tutelage and to enhance Spain’s position in Europe.
Aznar did not inherit the good relationship that Felipe González had
established with the Helmut Kohl and found it difficult to get on with Jacques
Chirac. Later, the French refusal to use its influence to resolve the crisis
between Spain and Morocco after Moroccan troops seized the miniscule island
of Perejil in July 2002 did nothing to endear Aznar to Chirac. Aznar took note
of the fact that it was the United States that defused the crisis (Colin Powell,
the US Secretary of State, telephoned the Moroccan king).
The seeds for greater links with Washington were already there, but it was
the closer political and personal affinity with Bush than with Clinton (whose
“third way” Aznar was not keen on), as well as Aznar’s firm determination to
use the US connection as a lever to try to obtain a seat for Spain in the long
term at the high table of developed countries – the G8 group – that set the
strengthened Atlanticism on course.
Bush “rewarded” Aznar by choosing Spain as the first stopping-off point
on his first visit to Europe in June 2001 (the first time any US president had
given Spain this privilege). Aznar used the opportunity to break ranks with his
EU counterparts and express support for Washington’s National Missile
Defence System (NMD), although a schism was averted by a joint declaration
also endorsing the European project to establish the Rapid Reaction Force.
Spanish officials had earlier visited the Pentagon and suggested that the
32. In 1997 the US State Department apologised to the Spanish government for describing ETA in its
annual report on human rights as a “separatist” rather than a “terrorist” group, and at the end of 1999 the US
agreed to extradite to Spain, after a lengthy legal process, Ramón Aldasoro, an ETA activist.