The Journey of Flight.pdf - Valkyrie Cadet

On July 27, 1953, a cease-fire treaty was signed, the fighting stopped, and Korea was almost
precisely where it had been in 1950. Although neither side finished the war as an outright victor, the
original objectives of the United Nations were accomplished. South Korea was once again an independent
nation.
In retrospect, the Korean War was a limited or political war; the first of several for the United
States. The overall controlling strategy of the war was to ensure that it did not enlarge into World War
III. This meant the war had to be limited, and political leaders rather than military leaders were in
charge of the strategy. This restricted the military leadership. Certain targets were placed off-limits.
For example, the Chinese airfields that were located north of the Korean border in Manchuria were offlimits.
American planes were not allowed to bomb targets north of the Yalu River, which marked the
Korean-Manchurian border. In fact, US aircraft could not even pursue communist aircraft across the
border. This meant that the communists could take off from their safe air bases in China, cross the Yalu
River to fight, and then return back across the Yalu to safety. This type of fighting was like boxing with
one hand tied behind your back.
Lessons Lessons Lessons Lessons Lessons Learned Learned Learned Learned Learned
Looking back, there were quite a
few lessons to be learned by the
Korean War. One was that US atomic
arsenal alone is not enough to prevent
involvement in war. Another was that
the United States was not prepared for
the Korean War. After World War II,
the United States drew down its
forces and invested in an Air Force
focused on delivering the atom bomb.
This meant that the Air Force
organized, trained and equipped to
fight a war with atom bombs. To do
The McDonnell F-101 B Voodoo was developed as an interceptor during
the 50s and later served in a reconnaissance role in Vietnam.
this, they created a large Strategic Air Command with plenty of bombers and atom bombs. They did
not invest in fighter aircraft, fighter tactics or fighter personnel. As a result, the US Air Force was not
prepared to support a ground war, and the United States paid for that mistake by giving up ground, and
losing men and equipment to the enemy.
Lastly, the military leaders forgot the lesson they had learned during the North African Air Campaign
during World War II. They forgot the benefits of having centralized control and decentralized execution.
They forgot the benefits of having one person in charge of the air effort. During the Korean War, air
assets were again divided with the Navy working in one area and the Air Force in the other. As a result,
coordination and timely execution was poor.
Despite all the problems experienced during the Korean War, the United States still felt that the
atom bomb could deter war. A comment by the Secretary of the Air Force, 1950 - 1953, Thomas K.
Finletter, summarizes the philosophy at this time, “The Korean War was a special case and air power
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