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Underwater Robots - Gianluca Antonelli.pdf

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82 4. Fault Detection/Tolerance Strategies for AUVs and ROVs<br />

thruster blocking It occurs when asolid body isbetween the propeller<br />

blades. It can be checked bymonitoring the current required by the thruster.<br />

It has been observed, e.g., during the Antarctic mission ofRomeo [61]: in<br />

that occurrence it was caused byablock of ice.<br />

flooded thruster Athruster flooded with water has been observed during<br />

aRomeo’s mission [61]. The consequence has been an electrical dispersion<br />

causing an increasing blade rotation velocity and thus athruster force higher<br />

then the desired one.<br />

fin stuck or lost This failure can causes aloss of steering capability as<br />

discussed bymeans of simple numerical simulations in [143].<br />

rotor failure Apossible consequence of different failures of the thrusters<br />

is the zeroing of the blade rotation. The thruster in question, thus, simply<br />

stops working. This has been intentionally experienced during experiments<br />

with ODIN [232, 233, 306, 307], RAUVER [140] and Roby 2[4] and during<br />

another Romeo’s mission [61].<br />

hardware-software failure Acrash in the hardware orsoftware implemented<br />

onthe vehicle can beexperienced. In this case, redundancy techniques<br />

can be implemented to handle such situations [42].<br />

4.3 Fault Detection Schemes<br />

In [3,4]amodel-based fault detection scheme is presented to isolate actuators’<br />

failures in the horizontal motion. Each thruster is modeled as in [127]. The<br />

algorithm is based onabank of Extended Kalman Filters (EKFs) the outputs<br />

of which are checked in order to detect behaviors not coherent with the<br />

dynamic model. In case of two horizontal thrusters and horizontal motion<br />

3EKFs are designed tosimulate the 3behaviors: nominal behavior, left<br />

thruster fault, right thruster fault. The cross-checking of the output allows<br />

efficient detection as it has been extensively validated experimentally (details<br />

are given in Section 4.5). Asketchofthis schemeisgiven in Figure 4.3 where u<br />

is the vector of thruster inputs and the vehicle yaw ψ is measured by means<br />

of acompass. In[5], the same approach isinvestigated with the use of a<br />

sliding-mode observer instead of the EKF. The effectiveness of this approach<br />

is also discussed by means of experiments.<br />

The work in [52, 61] focuses on thethruster failure detection by monitoring<br />

the motor current and the propeller’s revolution rate. The non-linear nominal<br />

characteristichas been experimentally identified,thus, if themeasured couple<br />

current-propeller’s rate is out of aspecific bound, then afault is experienced.<br />

Based onamapping ofthe i-o axis the possible cause is also specified with<br />

amessage tothe remote human operator. The two failures corresponding to<br />

athruster flooding or to arotor failure, in fact, fall in different axis regions<br />

and can be isolated. Interesting experiments are given in Section 4.5.

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