Underwater Robots - Gianluca Antonelli.pdf
Underwater Robots - Gianluca Antonelli.pdf
Underwater Robots - Gianluca Antonelli.pdf
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82 4. Fault Detection/Tolerance Strategies for AUVs and ROVs<br />
thruster blocking It occurs when asolid body isbetween the propeller<br />
blades. It can be checked bymonitoring the current required by the thruster.<br />
It has been observed, e.g., during the Antarctic mission ofRomeo [61]: in<br />
that occurrence it was caused byablock of ice.<br />
flooded thruster Athruster flooded with water has been observed during<br />
aRomeo’s mission [61]. The consequence has been an electrical dispersion<br />
causing an increasing blade rotation velocity and thus athruster force higher<br />
then the desired one.<br />
fin stuck or lost This failure can causes aloss of steering capability as<br />
discussed bymeans of simple numerical simulations in [143].<br />
rotor failure Apossible consequence of different failures of the thrusters<br />
is the zeroing of the blade rotation. The thruster in question, thus, simply<br />
stops working. This has been intentionally experienced during experiments<br />
with ODIN [232, 233, 306, 307], RAUVER [140] and Roby 2[4] and during<br />
another Romeo’s mission [61].<br />
hardware-software failure Acrash in the hardware orsoftware implemented<br />
onthe vehicle can beexperienced. In this case, redundancy techniques<br />
can be implemented to handle such situations [42].<br />
4.3 Fault Detection Schemes<br />
In [3,4]amodel-based fault detection scheme is presented to isolate actuators’<br />
failures in the horizontal motion. Each thruster is modeled as in [127]. The<br />
algorithm is based onabank of Extended Kalman Filters (EKFs) the outputs<br />
of which are checked in order to detect behaviors not coherent with the<br />
dynamic model. In case of two horizontal thrusters and horizontal motion<br />
3EKFs are designed tosimulate the 3behaviors: nominal behavior, left<br />
thruster fault, right thruster fault. The cross-checking of the output allows<br />
efficient detection as it has been extensively validated experimentally (details<br />
are given in Section 4.5). Asketchofthis schemeisgiven in Figure 4.3 where u<br />
is the vector of thruster inputs and the vehicle yaw ψ is measured by means<br />
of acompass. In[5], the same approach isinvestigated with the use of a<br />
sliding-mode observer instead of the EKF. The effectiveness of this approach<br />
is also discussed by means of experiments.<br />
The work in [52, 61] focuses on thethruster failure detection by monitoring<br />
the motor current and the propeller’s revolution rate. The non-linear nominal<br />
characteristichas been experimentally identified,thus, if themeasured couple<br />
current-propeller’s rate is out of aspecific bound, then afault is experienced.<br />
Based onamapping ofthe i-o axis the possible cause is also specified with<br />
amessage tothe remote human operator. The two failures corresponding to<br />
athruster flooding or to arotor failure, in fact, fall in different axis regions<br />
and can be isolated. Interesting experiments are given in Section 4.5.