Sicherheit und Risiko

ESPRIT St.Gallen Business Review
with its provisions. According to this view, the treaty
was concluded on the understanding that member
states were opting „for a sort of provisional virginity”,
making their abstention dependent on the non-occurrence
of events “that would force them to reconsider“
(Johan Holst). In fact, Article X of the NPT allowed
members to withdraw on a mere three months’ notice
in the event that „extraordinary events jeopardize
its supreme interests“—and this permissive wording
was, of course, no accident.
In spite of the tenuous nature of its bargains, the
nonproliferation regime survived the Cold War more
or less intact. Since then, however, existing provisions
and safeguard mechanisms have increasingly failed
to stem the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. Whereas
both the social reality and configurations of interest
and power have continued to evolve, the institutional
framework in essence has not. Moreover, the international
community has been unable or unwilling to
address the congenital flaws in the regime or to deal
effectively with their practical consequences. North
Korea is a case in point, and so is Iran. Beyond concerns
over the more established cases of Israel and
Japan, suspicions persist as regards the intentions of
Brazil and Saudi Arabia. As Andrew O’Neil points out,
“one of the unmistakable trends internationally since
the end of the Cold War has been the increasing number
of states seeking to acquire, at the very least, a
threshold nuclear capability.”
Since the nonproliferation regime was set up to
impose constraints on state actors, it is particularly
ill-equipped to deal with private actors who engage
in illicit nuclear commerce. The network of Pakistan’s
Abdul Qadeer Khan, for example, was actively involved,
over a period of nearly 20 years, in the delivery
of sensitive dual-use technology across a host of state
and non-state actors.
A regime beyond repair
If the preservation of the nonproliferation regime
depends on achieving a reasonable consensus to
the effect that ‘nonproliferation’ is a realistic objective
in the first place, prospects are grim indeed—for this
consensus has broken down. Can it be rebuilt? Can
the regime as such be revived? I do not think so. On
top of flagrant cases of noncompliance on the part of
have-nots, keep in mind that the established nuclear
powers themselves (the permanent five members of
the U.N. Security Council) keep nuclear weapons in
their arsenal both physically and conceptually. Consider
also that Israel, India, and Pakistan have paid little
or no price for going nuclear outside the regime. The
credibility and with it the integrity of the nonproliferation
project has long been damaged beyond repair.
Against the backdrop of the past twenty years,
it is remarkable to see just how many strategists in
government, in academia, and in nongovernmental
organizations continue to argue that the nonproliferation
battle is still worth fighting. What is more, in
2009 U.S. President Barack Obama joined a long list of
political and academic celebrities united in the cause
of “Global Zero”, declaring complete nuclear disarmament
a top priority.
The goal of ridding humanity of nuclear weapons
through the full elimination of arsenals has enjoyed
moral, emotional, and even intellectual appeal for decades.
Proponents of Global Zero are united in one
irrefutable argument: if the international community
could abolish these weapons, nuclear war would no
longer pose the ultimate threat to life and security.
Based upon Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
they hold that member states are bound, both morally
and legally, to rid the world of nukes. Some demand
that the established haves lead the way and embark
«We need to give up
on the illusion that
full nuclear
disarmament
represents a viable
policy option under
present conditions.»
immediately on a significant reduction; others argue
that the process needs to be more incremental to succeed.
Back to zero, really?
Crucially, all proponents start from the premise
that Global Zero can be achieved under present structural
conditions. Not surprisingly, they fail to provide
plausible answers to fundamental questions—questions
regarding both fundamental assumptions and the
process of disarmament. To name but a few: does peril
indeed come from the size of arsenals? Is stability
a function of numbers or of incentives? How would
any nuclear power be compelled to disarm? And even
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Winter 2012