Principios de Taxonomia
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10j 2 Why is there a Species Problem?<br />
of multiple evolutionary processes be compatible with taxonomy s objective of<br />
constructing a consistent mo<strong>de</strong> of classification?<br />
Evolution proceeds with varying speeds. There are old and young species.<br />
If evolutionarily old species are wi<strong>de</strong>ly spread geographically and their members<br />
are therefore distant from one another, then the organisms belonging to a species<br />
have evolved in different directions over time, regardless of the fact that they belong to<br />
the same species (Chapter 6). Geographically distant individuals within a species may<br />
differ substantially from one another both phenotypically and genetically (Garcia-<br />
Ramos and Kirkpatrick, 1997; Varga and Schmitt, 2008; Habel et al., 2009). How can<br />
this be compatible with the use of genetic distance as a criterion for <strong>de</strong>signating<br />
genetically different organisms as different species, which is a practice that forms the<br />
basis of the barcoding approach (Chapter 4)?<br />
This book gets to the bottom of such questions. It explains and illustrates many<br />
biological examples that are associated with taxonomic problems. In doing so, special<br />
emphasis is placed on genetic foundations. However, an attempt is also ma<strong>de</strong> to<br />
philosophically substantiate theoretical conclusions. The question of how organisms<br />
are grouped both in our mind and in nature will be addressed. It is shown that a<br />
grouping according to intrinsic traits differs substantially from a grouping according<br />
to relational connections. It is also <strong>de</strong>monstrated that the formation of a class is<br />
completely different from grouping organisms as historically transient singularities,<br />
as individuals in the philosophical sense (Chapter 3). The philosophical term of the<br />
natural kind is <strong>de</strong>alt with, together with the question of what is reality in contrast<br />
to a purely mental concept. Special emphasis is repeatedly given to the question of<br />
what is as distinct from the operational principle of what properties does<br />
something have (see below).<br />
In this book, species as objects of biology are often compared to the objects of<br />
chemistry, that is, atoms. In doing so, it is noted that the objects of biology are subject<br />
to evolution; they constantly change. In contrast, atoms are invariant. They would lose<br />
their class membership and thus become members of a new class if they changed in<br />
atomic number. In contrast, no living organism changes its class membership if it<br />
changes in some of its properties. A dipteran fly (the or<strong>de</strong>r of insects with two wings)<br />
remains a dipteran fly even if it experiences a mutation that causes it to <strong>de</strong>velop four<br />
wings (the Hox mutation).<br />
2.2<br />
Can Species be Defined and Delimited from one Another?<br />
The issue of biological species is one of the most curious problems of biology. Darwin<br />
once said something to the effect that everybody already seems to know what a species<br />
is: Noone<strong>de</strong>finitionhasyetsatisfiedallnaturalists,buteverynaturalistknowsvaguely<br />
what he means when he speaks of a species (Darwin, 1859). Everyone <strong>de</strong>als with this<br />
concept every day, but hardly anyone knows how to <strong>de</strong>fine the word species. What<br />
un<strong>de</strong>rlies this discrepancy between spontaneous subjective certainty ( but that s all<br />
obvious! ) and the fact that no one can indisputably say what a species is?