Principios de Taxonomia

These conclusions indeed sound paradoxical at first; however, this is only because
they contradict spontaneous intuition. Intuition, though, is no reason to have an
adverse attitude toward these conclusions. It is worthwhile to look for purely
theoretical solutions in science (and not only in philosophy). Albert Einstein said
something to the effect that he always desired to be able to explain empirical
observations made in nature with a theory. This theory must above all satisfy the
condition of being in accordance with laws of thought and not collide with them (cited
in Fischer, 2005). Is there a theoretical basis for morpho-species (a species defined
only by its morphological traits)? Can the theory of morpho-species be true or false?
Can the theory of morpho-species be falsifiable in the sense of the philosopher Karl
Popper? If not, is working with a morpho-species scientific?
Who can answer point-blank why the wolf and the fox are different species while
the mastiff and the dachshund are not? The renowned rotifer expert Walter Koste
(Germany) asked me several years ago by what right does he, cumbersomely and with
technical effort, describe new rotifer species that are distinguished by only a tiny,
hardly visible bristle, while he can distinguish some of his fellow humans comfortably
by their hair color or their respective blood group. What is the answer to this?
How should the conflict between anagenetic classification (classification of species
according to trait changes along the temporal axis) and cladogenetic classification
(classification of species according only to bifurcation) be dealt with? During
evolution, organisms undergo modification of traits in qualitative changes referred
to as anagenesis (Chapter 7 and Figure 2.3). However, this is not the only type of
change that occurs. Groups of organisms (species) also do something different from
the modification of traits in the course of evolution: the phylogenetic lineage splits off
into separate daughter branches. This is not a qualitative change but rather a
numerical, quantitative change known as cladogenesis. Qualitative and numerical
changes are markedly different evolutionary processes and cannot be measured by
the same yardstick.
Now we are confronted with a very difficult decision: is it anagenesis (the change in
traits) or cladogenesis (the purely numerical type of change) that represents the origin
of a new species? Or do both processes ultimately constitute the origin of new
species? In the latter case, there would be two different kinds of speciation and, thus,
two different kinds of species. A species cannot therefore be one and the same thing.
Evolution pursues different modes of alteration (Mayr and Ashlock, 1991), which is
why a conflict arises between anagenesis and cladogenesis. This conflict appears to be
irresolvable, as it implicitly contains the premise that both trait change and bifurcation
are simultaneously classified as speciation (Peters, 1998).
2.4
Species: To Exist, or not to Exist, that is the Question
2.4 Species: To Exist, or not to Exist, that is the Questionj15
There is no agreement about what a species is, and there is no agreement about
whether species are artificial constructs of our mind or whether they really exist
(Mishler, 1999). How then can someone claim to count species, to speak of reductions