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ARMS CONTROL Beyond Arms-Control Monitoring Raymond Jeanloz, 1 ,2 * Inez Fung, 1 Theodore W. Bowyer, 3 Steven C. Wofsy 4 ered burdensome, yet they need to be sustained into the indefi nite future. In particular, because compliance must be verifi ed, arms-control treaties can be intrusive and may be perceived as a challenge to the sovereignty of nations being monitored. This condition is unlikely to become easier in the foreseeable future. Treaty monitoring would presumably have to become both more intrusive and more pervasive (i.e., apply more generally to all nations) to the degree that there is progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, for example. Even without such progress, the advance of technology that empowers individuals for good or ill is likely to require enhanced monitoring of activities everywhere, all the time; as technology becomes more powerful, its misuse could outweigh benefi ts in new and unexpected ways. Arms-control treaties are also costly to those engaged in monitoring. This can lead to a “lose-lose” scenario, where (i) success of a treaty regime weakens the ability to sustain monitoring, yet (ii) any violation undermines confi dence in the treaty’s utility or relevance. For instance, if the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is successful in the sense that there are no nuclear explosions for many years or decades, it becomes diffi cult to justify the effort and expense associated with the CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS) ( 1). Even with the best intentions among all interested parties, sustaining technical capability is challenging when there is nothing to be measured. Nevertheless, any nuclear-explosion testing would undermine the CTBT; none would want treaty violation merely for the sake of exercising the IMS. However, the situation may not be so bad. Although potentially harmful applications of newly developed technologies may require ever more effort in monitoring, advances in technology can also facilitate monitoring and transparency. Still, it is important to identify a future “end state” for treaty monitoring that is realistic, sustainable, and provides credible and effective verifi cation ( 2), whether or not the verifi cation regime is actively applied. 1 University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94707, USA. 2 Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 3 Pacifi c Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99354, USA. 4 Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. *Author for correspondence. E-mail: jeanloz@berkeley.edu CREDIT: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH Arms-control treaties are often consid- Treaty monitoring can also serve as a deterrent: One might consider both the IMS and on-site inspection regimes under the CTBT to discourage nuclear-explosion testing. Fortunately, given the challenge of sustaining, let alone expanding, arms-control regimes, there is an opportunity to accomplish this “endstate” goal by identifying and implementing nontreaty applications of monitoring. We describe how treatymonitoring systems can be used for environmental monitoring, as well as how systems intended for monitoring the environment can be used to support arms-control. We focus on technical aspects, one piece of a larger puzzle involving diplomatic, economic, and other concerns. Opportunities: CTBT and Open Skies A major breakthrough in this regard came with the recognition that the CTBT IMS could have helped save many lives during the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster ( 3, 4). As a result, the international array of sensors initially deployed to monitor nuclear explosions is now also being used to enhance tsunami warning in the Indian Ocean. To expand this capability worldwide, more sensors could be deployed and response times further shortened. More recently, the ability to monitor radionuclides in the atmosphere—including with IMS measurement systems—played a prominent role in tracking the radioactive plume of gas and debris from the 2011 Fukushima accident ( 5). The data provided national health authorities vital information regarding expected dose rates to populations. Atmospheric monitoring has also been key to managing air travel and maintaining safety during volcanic eruptions, aiding hundreds of thousands of individuals ( 4). In these ways, even though the main role of the IMS is currently related to specifi c treaty objectives, it is clear that the IMS also has great value for nontreaty applications. The IMS benefits from an infrastructure, including a rapidly growing community of technical experts being established in countries around the world ( 6). This is not only a matter of important capacity build- POLICYFORUM Environmental monitoring can become a useful long-term objective of arms-control treaty verifi cation. The HIAPER aircraft approaching Deadhorse, Alaska. ing, through enhanced scientifi c capability in developing nations; it also means that— should there be cause for discussing a violation of the CTBT, let alone for demanding on-site inspections—there is already a vastly expanded population of experts who can reliably assess the technical evidence associated with nuclear explosions. Although any discussions of treaty violations are likely to be highly political, the main point is that it is useful to have more—rather than fewer— who can reliably evaluate the technical monitoring information. That community of scientifi c experts has grown by many hundreds in just the past few years, because of implementation of the CTBT monitoring capability, and it is likely to keep growing for many years ( 7). Those experts, in turn, become important resources in enhancing their own countries’ abilities to respond to—perhaps even mitigate or avoid— natural catastrophes, pollution, stresses associated with resource depletion, and so on ( 8). The Open Skies Treaty (OST), fi rst proposed by U.S. President Eisenhower in 1955 and signed in 1992 during President George H. W. Bush’s administration, is likewise providing opportunities for significant nontreaty applications of aircraft-based monitoring. With more than 840 successful observational fl ights ( 9) over the United States, Russia, and partner countries since entry into force in 2002 ( 10), OST provides far more detailed monitoring, via aircraft-borne sensors, than is possible by satellite ( 11). www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 339 15 FEBRUARY 2013 761 Published by AAAS on February 14, 2013 www.sciencemag.org Downloaded from
POLICYFORUM 762 The OST regime has potentially more fl exibility than CTBT in supporting nontreaty applications of monitoring. Existing OST monitoring platforms have been successfully used, for example, in support of humanitarian relief after the 2005 hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States and the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti ( 12). Moreover, Russia has expressed support for this concept ( 13), so there may be opportunities for fi elding new technologies in aircraft-based monitoring ( 11) and for at least bilateral (and ultimately multilateral) engagement through nontreaty monitoring. A case in point is the characterization and tracking of dust in the atmosphere, which faces challenges similar to those of global radionuclide monitoring. Lofted across continents and oceans, dust has an important infl uence on climate because it can both absorb and refl ect sunlight, and its distribution is a symptom of global atmospheric conditions ( 14– 18). Microorganisms are also transported along with the dust, so that public health is affected over intercontinental distances ( 19– 21). Despite its signifi cance for environment and health (from agriculture and climate to pollution and disease), little is known about the nature of dust in the troposphere. Much could be learned from physical collections made possible by complementary surface- and aircraft-based platforms. More generally, collection of gases and aerosols both at and above ground level can greatly improve atmospheric-transport models, which have applications ranging from medium- and long-term weather forecasting to tracking radioactive plumes caused by human activity. Examples of success include a study using the distribution of krypton-85 to constrain atmospheric transport times between northern and southern hemispheres ( 22). Similarly, the Global Network of Isotopes in Precipitation, operated jointly by the International Atomic Energy Agency and World Meteorological Organization, provides data that have led to improved quantifi - cation of sources and transformation of water in the atmosphere, as well as better predictions of precipitation ( 23). Aircraft can measure vertical profi les of constituents in the atmosphere much better than satellites, providing data crucial for identifying sources and sinks (e.g., for CO 2 and other greenhouse gases). For example, “Civil Aircraft for the Regular Investigation of the Atmosphere Based on an Instrument Container” (www.caraabic-atmospheric. org) uses an instrumented passenger airliner to monitor gases and aerosols and has proven to be invaluable for tracking volcanic clouds, air pollution, and much more. Similarly, the High-performance Instrumented Airborne Platform for Environmental Research (HIAPER) Pole-to-Pole Observations Project used a Gulfstream V research plane (see the photo) to document concentrations of CO 2, CH 4, and many other gases from sea level up to 47,000 feet, with unique science return from hundreds of profi les along the Pacifi c ( 24). But only fi ve pole-to-pole transects have been completed to date. This fl ight design can serve either treaty or environmental monitoring objectives. Collecting and analyzing gas and particulate data are essential for improving atmospheric transport models and greatly advance the ability to characterize the atmosphere to distances of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers from a fl ight path or a groundbased station. That is, the information can help in monitoring neighboring countries, as well as the country being overfl own ( 25). Finally, airborne LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging, the laser-based analog of RADAR) can play an important role in monitoring forest carbon stocks ( 26). This is valuable for such efforts as the United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation program, as well as broader applications. We have touched on a few examples to illustrate rich opportunities for scientific advancement and international cooperation that would be offered by implementing far more extensive aircraft- and ground-based environmental monitoring around the globe. Recommendations In some sense, nontreaty applications should be viewed as one of the ultimate long-term objectives of an arms-control monitoring regime. Without such applications, monitoring may not be sustainable. With such applications, however, monitoring can be enhanced through implementation of new technologies, engagement of more participants and—more generally—through improvements in transparency among nations. Specifi cally, our recommendations are (i) to acknowledge the opportunities offered by nontreaty applications of monitoring capabilities that originally derive from arms-control regimes; (ii) to develop and implement concrete, realistic plans to pursue those opportunities, requiring input from many disciplines and countries; and (iii) for the United States and willing partners to take leadership in promoting nontreaty applications of monitoring, starting with bilateral projects. A key aspect to implementation of nontreaty monitoring is to defi ne approaches that 15 FEBRUARY 2013 VOL 339 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org Published by AAAS are fl exible, clear, and mutually acceptable to all parties concerned. There is opportunity not only for applying existing capabilities to new circumstances, but also in developing new technologies for global environmental monitoring that can serve the broader mandate of improving transparency and enhancing confi - dence. The idea is to create a win-win scenario whereby the monitoring capability is viewed as benefi cial to all, perhaps even fi rst and foremost of benefi t to the country being studied. References and Notes 1. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Of 337 planned IMS facilities, 274 have thus far been certifi ed. See ( 3). 2. U.S. Ambassador Paul Nitze defi ned ”effective verifi cation” in 1988 as: “if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily signifi cant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefi t of the violation.” 3. CTBTO Preparatory Commission, www.ctbto.org/ verifi cation-regime/. 4. O. Dahlman et al., Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban? (Springer, New York, 2011). 5. A. Stohl et al., Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss. 11, 28319 (2011). 6. Capacity Development Initiative, www.ctbto.org. 7. There is considerable variability in this growth: see ( 4, 6). 8. Details on implementation, cost, etc., are complicated by differences among monitoring technologies (e.g., seismic versus radionuclide) and the associated research communities. 9. A small fraction of attempted overfl ights are not successful due to weather or mechanical problems. 10. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Open Skies Treaty Observation Flights, From Entry- Into-Force to December 2011 [Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), Vienna, 2012]; www.osce.org/ secretariat/68315/. 11. S. D. Drell, C. W. Stubbs, Arms Control Today 41(6), 15 (2011). 12. M. Betts, D. Spence, presentation at 2nd Open Skies Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, 7 to 9 June 2010 (OSCC, Vienna, 2010); www.osce.org/secretariat/68251. 13. S. Federyakov, presentation at 2nd Open Skies Review Conference, Vienna, Austria, 7 to 9 June 2010 (OSCC, Vienna, 2010); www.osce.org/secretariat/68573. 14. J. M. Prospero et al., Rev. Geophys. 40, 1002 (2002). 15. D. M. Cwiertny, M. A. Young, V. H. Grassian, Annu. Rev. Phys. Chem. 59, 27 (2008). 16. K. A. Prather, C. D. Hatch, V. H. Grassian, Annu. Rev. Anal. Chem. 1, 485 (2008). 17. M. Pósfai, P. R. Buseck, Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci. 38, 17 (2010). 18. S. A. Strode, L. E. Ott, S. Pawson, T. W. Bowyer, J. Geophys. Res. 117, (D9), D09302 (2012). 19. D. W. Griffi n, Clin. Microbiol. Rev. 20, 459 (2007). 20. S. Ravi et al., Rev. Geophys. 49, RG3001 (2011). 21. C. E. Morris et al., Biogeosciences 8, 17 (2011). 22. D. J. Jacob et al., J. Geophys. Res. 92, (D6), 6614 (1987). 23. Global Network of Isotopes in Precipitation, www-naweb. iaea.org/napc/ih/IHS_resources_gnip.html. 24. S. Wofsy et al., Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. A 369, 2073 (2011). 25. This can have practical implications in that a friendly neighboring state may more readily authorize overfl ights. 26. Forest Carbon and Credent form partnership on LiDAR technology, http://forest-carbon.org/media/forestcarbon-credent-lidar-partnership. Acknowledgments: We thank S. D. Drell, J. E. Goodby, G. P. Shultz, and C. W. Stubbs for helpful discussions. Views presented here are the authors’ and do not necessarily refl ect those of the U.S. government. 10.1126/science.1228731 on February 14, 2013 www.sciencemag.org Downloaded from
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